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INTRODUCTION 
The multilingual landscape continues to expand in social and 
business sectors, but in the judicial arena, it is still an uncomfortable 
fit.  Interpreters are a relatively new fixture in American courts.  
Judges and trial attorneys spend enormous energy sharpening their 
use of language, but most consider interpreters too blunt an instru-
ment to accurately convey their exact intent across language barriers.  
Parties to the litigation harbor similar concerns about their accessibili-
ty to the proceedings when language passes through what they con-
sider an interpreter’s sieve.  For example, at the onset of the Nurem-
berg trials following World War II, Reich Marshal Hermann Göring 
famously responded, after being asked if he wanted counsel to 
represent him against charges of war crimes, “Of course, I want coun-
sel.  But it is even more important to have a good interpreter.”1 
Interpreters often provide non–English speakers their only access 
to court proceedings.2  Equally important, they provide the court with 
its only access to non-English-speaking defendants and witnesses.  This 
Comment addresses one particular class of non–English speakers:  
deaf adults who are called to testify as witnesses in civil or criminal 
court but who lack both spoken and sign language proficiency.3  Mi-
 
1 Germany:  The Defendants, TIME, Oct. 29, 1945, at 38, available at http:// 
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,776327,00.html.  In fact, Göring re-
peatedly used interpreter error as one of the foundations for his defense, which was 
conducted simultaneously in four languages.  See FRANCESCA GAIBA, THE ORIGINS OF 
SIMULTANEOUS INTERPRETATION:  THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 108-11 (1998) (describing 
Göring’s deft exploitation of minor weaknesses in the tribunal’s system of language in-
terpretation). 
2 An interpreter’s task is to take an initial spoken or signed message in the source 
language and instantly reproduce it accurately in the target language.  See NANCY 
FRISHBERG, INTERPRETING:  AN INTRODUCTION 18 (rev. ed. 1990) (noting that “the de-
fining characteristic [of interpretation] is . . . live and immediate transmission”).  On 
the other hand, a translator’s task, when used in its more narrow or technical sense, is 
to take a written text in the source language and reproduce it accurately in the target 
language.  See id.  
3 In accordance with the conventions of American Deaf culture scholarship, au-
thors typically differentiate between “deafness” as an audiological status and “Deafness” 
as a cultural affiliation.  Use of “deaf” with a lowercase “d” is meant to include all forms 
of significant audiological impairment, whereas “Deaf” with an uppercase “D” is meant 
to include only those deaf individuals who use sign language to communicate and who 
generally identify themselves as members of a larger deaf community.  See ANNA MIN-
DESS, READING BETWEEN THE SIGNS:  INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION FOR SIGN LAN-
GUAGE INTERPRETERS ch. 5 (2d ed. 2006) (cataloguing Deaf cultural norms, strategies 
of communication, community behaviors, and shared values).  See generally PADDY 
LADD, UNDERSTANDING DEAF CULTURE:  IN SEARCH OF DEAFHOOD chs. 1-5 (2003) (ana-
lyzing Deaf communities and historical and contemporary views of Deaf people in socie-
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chele LaVigne and McCay Vernon write that although many deaf 
adults succeed as doctors, lawyers, stay-at-home moms, and factory 
workers, the confluence of a restrictive environment, a poor or failed 
attempt at education, and sometimes other biological limitations de-
prives some deaf people of the opportunity to acquire a language 
foundation in either English or sign language.4  These semilingual or 
nonlingual deaf adults are often termed as having Minimal Language 
Skills (MLS).5  Generally, these individuals are highly visually oriented, 
 
ty, and presenting a comparison of hearing and Deaf cultural discourses).  This Com-
ment deals nearly exclusively with culturally Deaf adults, but the differentiation is not es-
sential to the legal argument.  Thus, this Comment will refer to “deaf adults” throughout 
with the understanding that the affected individuals come from both categories. 
 An understanding of the implications of this distinction, however, is a helpful 
component to the overall linguistic foundation later addressed in this Comment.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 15-16.  Harlan Lane has written two of the authoritative 
books on the emergence of a national Deaf identity following the establishment of 
schools that taught deaf children through sign language.  For a comprehensive review 
of Deaf history, see HARLAN LANE, WHEN THE MIND HEARS:  A HISTORY OF THE DEAF 
(1984).  For a review of the subsequent oppression the community faced in the age of 
eugenics, oralism, and beyond, see HARLAN LANE, THE MASK OF BENEVOLENCE:  DIS-
ABLING THE DEAF COMMUNITY 132-35, 213-16 (1992). 
4 One federally funded study described this population as “a group of individuals 
with inadequate or no environmental supports whose functional skills and competen-
cies are considered to be significantly below average making them the most at risk and 
underserved portion of the overall deaf population.”  LOW FUNCTIONING DEAF STRA-
TEGIC WORK GROUP, POSTSECONDARY EDUC. PROGRAMS NETWORK, A MODEL FOR A NA-
TIONAL COLLABORATIVE SERVICE DELIVERY SYSTEM 1 (2004), http://www.nad.org/ 
sites/default/files/LFDPosition.pdf.  “These individuals,” the paper notes, “over the 
years, have been given a variety of labels, including underachieving, multiply handi-
capped, severely disabled, minimal language skilled and traditionally underserved, in 
addition to the current label of low functioning deaf (LFD).  None of these labels ade-
quately describe the population.”  Id.; see also Michele LaVigne & McCay Vernon, An 
Interpreter Isn’t Enough:  Deafness, Language, and Due Process, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 843, 848-
49, 867  (discussing the inadequacy of current court practices that seek to ensure that 
language-deficient parties understand the proceedings fully).  LaVigne and Vernon 
use as examples two individuals, both deaf since birth, who exhibit this type of lan-
guage deficiency.  The first, Jesse, has a minimal brain dysfunction (but could not be 
classified as “retarded”), was poorly educated in an inner-city school, uses a diverse 
mixture of signs and gestures to communicate, and reads at a level between first and 
second grade.  Id. at 844.  The second, Maryellen, has low-normal intelligence with 
some nonretardation cognitive deficits, but she was raised in a family that did not learn 
sign language, and she was only sent to a deaf school at the age of ten when it became 
obvious that she was not progressing in a mainstream public school.  Id. at 846. 
5 See, e.g., LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 845 n.4; Katrina R. Miller & McCay 
Vernon, Assessing Linguistic Diversity in Deaf Criminal Suspects, 2 SIGN LANGUAGE STUD. 
380, 381 (2002) (noting that the use of various terms in addition to MLS to define 
these individuals—such as underserved, highly visual, Deaf-plus, low functioning, lin-
guistically incompetent, semilingual, or having Primitive Personality Disorder—
“reflects varying sociopolitical perspectives, demonstrating a range of clinical descrip-
tions, psycholinguistic designations, and community-based attempts to recognize yet 
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low functioning, functionally illiterate, and uneducated; they often go 
through life using tidbits of the majority language (whether it is Eng-
lish or American Sign Language) and systems of gesture.6 
How should a court accommodate this type of witness?  Many 
court practices grew out of how the courts learned to deal with MLS 
deaf defendants in the criminal system.  The case of Donald Lang, a 
deaf man accused of two murders in Chicago, is a well-publicized ex-
ample of courts wrestling with this issue.7  Lang came from a poor 
black neighborhood in Chicago, never attended school, and never 
learned even a first language.8  Despite having what could have been 
the best attorney-defendant fit in lawyer Lowell Myers,9 who was him-
 
destigmatize this condition”).  It is estimated that thirty percent of Deaf children leave 
secondary school functionally illiterate, with only three percent of eighteen-year-old 
deaf students reading on par with the average eighteen-year-old hearing reader.  See 
MARC MARSCHARK ET AL., EDUCATING DEAF STUDENTS:  FROM RESEARCH TO PRACTICE 
157 (2002).  Another authority found that the fiftieth percentile of deaf eighteen-year-
olds read at below the fourth grade reading level.  Carol Bloomquist Traxler, The Stan-
ford Achievement Test, 9th Edition:  National Norming and Performance Standards for Deaf and 
Hard-of-Hearing Students, 5 J. DEAF STUD. & DEAF EDUC. 337, 342 (2000).  A study of a 
Texas inmate population found the reading level for more than a third of ninety-seven 
inmates to be below grade level 2.8, which is the government’s classification for func-
tional illiteracy.  Katrina R. Miller, McCay Vernon & Michele E. Capella, Violent Offend-
ers in a Deaf Prison Population, 10 J. DEAF STUD. & DEAF EDUC. 417, 421 tbl.3 (2005).  
Inadequate early education is not the sole cause of this rampant semilingualism.  
Deafness is often combined with other etiologies in ways that may complicate learning 
disabilities.  See MCCAY VERNON & JEAN F. ANDREWS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEAFNESS:  
UNDERSTANDING DEAF AND HARD-OF-HEARING PEOPLE ch. 3 (1990); Tom Harrington, 
FAQ:  Etiologies and Causes of Deafness, http://library.gallaudet.edu/Library/ 
Deaf_Research_Help/Frequently_Asked_Questions_(FAQs)/Cultural_Social_Medical/
Etiologies_and_Causes_of_Deafness.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
6 See Patrick Boudreault, Deaf Interpreters (explaining the emergence of Deaf facili-
tators working alongside hearing interpreters to help ensure successful communica-
tion with semilingual individuals), in TOPICS IN SIGNED LANGUAGE INTERPRETING 323, 
331-33 (Terry Janzen ed., 2005); Katrina R. Miller, Linguistic Diversity in a Deaf Prison 
Population:  Implications for Due Process, 9 J. DEAF STUD. & DEAF EDUC. 112, 112-13 (2004) 
(identifying barriers likely to obstruct due process for those deaf adults with inade-
quate linguistic abilities).   
7 For a nonfiction account of the earlier portions of Lang’s story, see ERNEST TI-
DYMAN, DUMMY (1974). 
8 Id. at 6-7, 17-18.  Lang’s story is often retold or summarized to highlight prob-
lems with linguistic incompetency issues.  See Jamie Mickelson, Note, “Unspeakable Jus-
tice”:  The Oswaldo Martinez Case and the Failure of the Legal System to Adequately Provide for 
Incompetent Defendants, 48 WM & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2081-85 (2007). 
9 DVD:  20th Century Chicago Stories:  Deaf Lives and Experiences ch. 8 (Bob 
Paul 2005) (on file with author).  Myers’s obituary in the Chicago Tribune also de-
scribes his legal career and his handling of the Lang case.  See Trevor Jensen, Lowell J. 
Myers:  1930–2006, Legal Voice for the Deaf, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 9, 2006, at C12, availa-
ble at http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2006/nov/09/news/chi-0611090222nov09. 
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self deaf, Lang’s situation confounded the Illinois system.  In no fewer 
than nine reported decisions, the courts wrestled with how to accom-
modate Lang.10  The crux of the issue was whether Lang was unfit to 
stand trial because he was linguistically incompetent and therefore 
unable to assist in his own defense.11  As a result, Lang fought for years 
against indefinite confinement in a mental institution despite his lack 
of any mental illness.12  In a similar case, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
approved of the involuntary commitment of James Williams, also deaf 
and nonlingual, without a trial because he lacked the ability to effec-
tively communicate.13  These are not merely the results of yesteryear’s 
application of justice; courts continue to wrestle with deaf semilingual 
or nonlingual adults’ linguistic incompetency today.14 
It may seem a bit unbelievable that, in this digital and enlightened 
age, native-born Americans can live with parents and siblings, attend 
school each day, and yet emerge as adults who lack a simple and fun-
damental foundation in English or some other language.  LaVigne 
and Vernon explain why one must first understand the basics of deaf-
ness, language acquisition, and interpretation before appreciating the 
extent of nonlingualism that can occur within our own schools and 
communities: 
[O]ur experiences at counsel table and on the witness stand have taught 
us that without a step-by-step discussion of the hows and whys of deafness 
 
10 For a more detailed review of Lang’s cases, see Eric Eckes, Comment, The In-
competency of Courts and Legislatures:  Addressing Linguistically Deprived Deaf Defendants, 75 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1649, 1665-67 & n.92 (2007). 
11 See People v. Lang, 325 N.E.2d 305, 309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (analyzing the 
State’s argument that Lang’s profound communicative disabilities made it impossible 
to understand the charges, and concluding that the lack of adequate trial procedures 
rendered his trial constitutionally impermissible). 
12 See People v. Lang, 391 N.E.2d 350, 351-52 (Ill. 1979) (chronicling Lang’s trials 
and hospitalizations over a fourteen-year period). 
13 See State v. Williams, 392 So. 2d 641, 643-44 (La. 1980) (permitting conditional 
confinement to determine fitness to promptly stand trial). 
14 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, No. 03-0226, 2008 WL 5204063, at *1 (E.D. 
Tenn. Dec. 11, 2008) (“This case presents a challenging and troubling quandary:  How 
can the Court afford fundamental due process protections . . . to a man with substan-
tial cognitive and communicative deficits whose impairments render him unable to 
meaningfully participate in his own defense?”); Mickelson, supra note 8, at 2079 (ana-
lyzing the case of a deaf-mute man with almost no communication skills who was or-
dered to undergo intensive language acquisition to attempt to render him competent 
for trial).  For a discussion of linguistic incompetence among the deaf generally, see 
McCay Vernon & Katrina Miller, Linguistic Incompetence to Stand Trial:  A Unique Condition 
in Some Deaf Defendants, 2001 J. INTERPRETATION 99, 99-100.  For a discussion of possible 
outcomes after a determination of linguistic incompetence and proposals for how to bet-
ter handle the linguistically incompetent, see Eckes, supra note 10, at 1673-79. 
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and language acquisition, a legal argument that a defendant did not un-
derstand because he never fully acquired language is likely to be met 
with skepticism, if not incredulity.  This skepticism does not arise from 
some antideaf sentiment but from the counterintuitive quality of the 
subject matter.  For those of us who have heard all of our lives, and espe-
cially for those of us who use words for a living, the idea that a person 
could be left without a language is beyond imagining.
15
 
LaVigne and Vernon “start at the beginning” with a survey of the 
relevant facets of deafness that lead to linguistic incompetence.16  
They then counsel how courts can be better prepared to accommo-
date MLS deaf participants. 
When even the most skilled American Sign Language (ASL) in-
terpreters cannot fully bridge the linguistic and cultural gaps with an 
MLS party or witness in the courtroom, courts may then use a unique 
type of intermediary interpreter to facilitate communication.  This in-
termediary, known as a relay interpreter or a certified deaf interpreter 
(CDI),17 is most often a deaf adult who possesses extraordinary visual-
gestural communication skills and abilities18 by virtue of native deaf-
ness and specialized training, enabling her to effectively bridge lin-
guistic barriers.  If the court’s ASL interpreter is unable to facilitate 
communication with a semilingual or nonlingual party or witness in 
the courtroom, the court may pair the ASL interpreter with a CDI.19 
 
15 LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 849-50. 
16 See id. at 849.  This Comment omits the valuable history and context available in 
LaVigne and Vernon’s article. 
17 See generally Boudreault, supra note 6. 
18 Daniel Gile notes that linguistic knowledge is not enough to ensure compre-
hension; a language user must also have certain extralinguistic knowledge about the 
outside world.  DANIEL GILE, BASIC CONCEPTS AND MODELS FOR INTERPRETER AND 
TRANSLATOR TRAINING 77-79 (1995).  Native deafness is a particularly important cha-
racteristic for these intermediaries because it means they possess certain extralinguistic 
knowledge they gained through their own first-hand experiences using and discerning 
meaning amid a visual-gestural language or protolanguage.  See Roger J. Carver & Mike 
Kemp, Visual Gestural Communication:  Enhancing Early Communication and Litera-
cy in Young Deaf and Hard of Hearing Children 6-7 (1995) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/
0000019b/80/14/4d/a5.pdf (describing one of the authors’ communications with 
MLS individuals and the ability of such individuals to understand each other at inter-
national Deaf gatherings using visual-gestural communication). 
19 As described in more detail below, the two levels of interpretation required by 
this process present special challenges to accuracy.  One study shows that the linguistic 
competence or incompetence of the deaf consumer notwithstanding, CDIs working 
with hearing interpreters significantly differ from hearing interpreters working alone 
in pauses, eye gaze, head nods, quantity of signs, and fingerspelling when conveying 
the source message into the target language.  See Carolyn I. Ressler, A Comparative 
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For example, imagine an exchange between an attorney and an 
MLS witness.  When the attorney asks her question in spoken English, 
the hearing ASL interpreter provides that question to the CDI in 
American Sign Language; the CDI then tries to communicate with the 
witness using whatever means she can.  The CDI and the MLS witness 
then go back and forth until they develop some mutual understanding, 
some shared corpus of gesture that temporarily creates a communica-
tive bond between the two.  When the CDI feels confident that the wit-
ness both understands the questions and has provided an understanda-
ble response, she then uses sign language to formulate that response 
and presents that signed formulation in ASL to the ASL interpreter, 
who interprets that utterance into English and voices it audibly for the 
record.  Such an exchange may look like this: 
Attorney Question to MLS Witness:  Did you take the train home that night? 
ASL Interpreter to CDI:  THAT NIGHT, TRAIN HOME YOU-RIDE?
20
 
CDI to MLS Witness:  [Here, the CDI would engage the witness in visual-
gestural but nonlingual fashion to first arrive at the basic concepts in the 
question.  For example, assume the CDI has previously developed the 
concept of evening from the previous questions and represents that con-
cept in visual-gestural fashion by using an arm to represent the horizon, 
followed by a clasped hand to represent the orb of the sun, the falling of 
the clasped hands below the horizon arm, and a closed-eyes flailing ges-
ture indicating darkness.  Also assume the CDI has a recent method to 
identify this particular night, perhaps the night of the incident in question 
upon which the witness is testifying.  Once established, the CDI can then 
set up the spatial identity of the MLS witness’s starting point, build her end 
point, and ask if he took a train home.  Each of these spatial referents will 
require significant development and may rely on features, functions, or ac-
tivities of buildings (e.g., the place where the MLS witness works, shops for 
food, or sleeps) and other objects (e.g., physical descriptions of the train, 
procedures for paying at a turnstile or showing a ticket or pass to the con-
ductor, or one’s physical stance while riding the train).
21
] 
 
Analysis of a Direct Interpretation and an Intermediary Interpretation in American Sign Lan-
guage, 1999 J. INTERPRETATION 71, 81-88. 
20 This is necessarily an imprecise transcription of an ASL utterance because, 
among other things, it lacks notations for the required nonmanual markers and it as-
sumes earlier establishment of spatial referents that would likely be employed in an 
actual interpreting situation.  However, this simplified transcription will suffice for 
these purposes. 
21 Many American-born MLS deaf adults may know some standardized ASL signs 
for commonplace concepts, which here could include TRAIN or NIGHT.  Even then, 
however, the spatial and temporal referents about the night in question and other sim-
ilar feats of syntax may not be among the signs or concepts widely used or easily un-
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MLS Witness to CDI:  [Here, the MLS witness responds in visual-gestural 
form, but not in a succinct chunk of linguistic information; instead, the 
witness and the CDI together build an understanding through gesture 
for certain acts or objects.  The witness describes standing near a 
turnstile, looking around the ground, but finding no small round and 
flat items in his pocket to drop into the box.  He then actually removes 
his wallet from his pocket, pretends to look inside, and shrugs with a dis-
appointed face.  Next, he mimes looking around on the floor near the 
box, his eyes darting all around.  Last, he mimes that he zips up his coat, 
wraps his scarf tightly around his neck, and walks into the distance.  The 
response, though, would not likely be bundled up together in a single 
stream of communication.  The response would also likely be unintellig-
ible to most others in the courtroom,
22
 including the ASL interpreters, 
because the miming and gesturing would be so nuanced and, in a sense, 
deaf-centric, that it would require the specialized skills of the CDI to not 
only understand the communication, but also to elicit it in a form that 
achieves the communication’s objectives.  More likely, the CDI would 
have ascertained tidbits here and there during long turn-taking sessions 
to develop this response.] 
CDI to ASL Interpreter:  TRAIN STATION, THERE ARRIVE.  TOKEN 
NONE, MONEY NONE, SO LOOK-NEAR-GROUND++.  FIND NONE, 
SO BUNDLE-UP, WALK++. 
ASL Interpreter to Attorney:  When I got to the train station, I didn’t have any 
tokens or money.  I looked around on the ground for some, but I didn’t 
find any, so I wrapped myself up to keep warm and then walked away.
23
 
 
derstood among MLS deaf adults.  Courtroom use of concepts such as JURY or PLEA 
exacerbate these problems. 
22 Prominent neuroscientist and captivating writer Oliver Sacks discusses a com-
monly held perception about one’s ability to discern meaning from visual-manual 
communication: 
Notions that “the sign language” of the deaf is no more than a sort of panto-
mime, or pictorial language, were almost universally held even thirty years 
ago. . . .   
 There is, indeed, a paradox here:  at first Sign looks pantomimic; if one pays 
attention, one feels, one will “get it” soon enough—all pantomimes are easy to 
get.  But as one continues to look, no such “Aha!” feeling occurs; one is tanta-
lized by finding it, despite its seeming transparency, unintelligible. 
OLIVER SACKS, SEEING VOICES 61 (Vintage Books 2000) (1989). 
23 Some interpreters would choose to convey the MLS witness’s answer in full 
narrative form, despite the closed nature of the question’s form.  See, e.g., People v. 
Vasquez, No. B162629, 2004 WL 348785, at *3 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2004).  This 
difference is often ascribed to variance between the low-context nature of English and 
the high-context nature of many sign languages and systems.  See generally MINDESS, su-
pra note 3, at 45-50.  An alternative spoken-English interpretation retaining the high-
context narrative could be “I got to the station and realized I didn’t have any money 
for a ticket, so after looking around on the ground for some spare change or a token, I 
gave up, wrapped myself tightly in my coat and scarf, and started the walk home.”  This 
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This Comment focuses on what happens within the above brack-
ets—the gesturing, the miming, the turn taking, and the communica-
tion inventing—that has historically remained beyond the ordinary 
view of the court.  Courts have developed multiple options for ensur-
ing the accuracy of courtroom interpreters, such as voir dire, monitor 
interpreters, and videotaping,24 but these fail to address one drastic 
difference between regular interpreters and intermediary interpreters.  
Unlike regular interpreters who must not converse privately with a 
witness on the stand and who must not deviate even slightly from the 
source language, intermediary interpreters necessarily have a wider 
latitude when working with a semilingual or nonlingual witness.  This 
latitude exists, but the CDI “is not adding information or explaining 
concepts to the deaf litigant; rather the deaf interpreter is accessing a 
far richer store of ASL [or gestural] constructs than is available to an 
interpreter who is tethered to sound.”25  CDIs undergo certification 
testing and scrutiny to ensure that they understand the importance of 
treading lightly and not inducing or leading testimony, but the parties 
can easily be left with a less-than-complete picture of what happened 
behind the veil. 
What if, within this area of wider latitude, an error occurs—an er-
ror of substantive fact or an adjustment in the form or function of the 
intended question or answer?  Parties in the courtroom may be unable 
to object to errors in the interpretation because they may not even 
realize they occurred.  Sometimes, a substantive error would be quite 
obvious, such as an MLS witness answering “Who was standing?” when 
asked if she was asleep at a particular moment.26  But other substantive 
errors can occur unnoticed, such as a missed pronoun that would cla-
rify who was sleeping and who was awake.27  Within this complex lin-
 
Comment also addresses the effects of the interpreter presenting narrative answers.  
See infra notes 147-151 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra subsection II.B.2. 
25 CARLA M. MATHERS, NAT’L CONSORTIUM OF INTERPRETER EDUC. CTRS., DEAF 
INTERPRETERS IN COURT:  AN ACCOMMODATION THAT IS MORE THAN REASONABLE 20-
21 (2009). 
26 This was an actual exchange between the questioning attorney and an MLS deaf 
witness in a murder trial.  Vasquez, 2004 WL 348785, at *4. 
27 See id.  The MLS deaf witness in Vasquez had initially testified that the victim’s 
girlfriend was asleep, but the CDI-ASL interpreter team misunderstood that testimony 
and erroneously presented it as though the witness herself was asleep.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 205-215.  Such errors can come about in different ways.  For ex-
ample, in ASL, the pronoun error could be an error of structured space, see MARTY M. 
TAYLOR, INTERPRETATION SKILLS:  ENGLISH TO AMERICAN SIGN LANGUAGE §§ 29–35 
(1993), or an error of eye gaze and indexing, see CHARLOTTE BAKER-SHENK & DENNIS 
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gual and semilingual interaction, the CDI may inadvertently fore-
ground a particular point, misunderstand a particular gesture, or lead 
the witness in a way that introduces an error into the interpretation.28  
The courts have several safeguards for more common interpreted 
courtroom situations,29 but those protections may not suffice here.  A 
party must timely object to errors in the interpretation,30 but will a 
party notice the error in the CDI’s work during the few moments 
when the objection is ripe? 
Certainly, CDIs provide an essential service to the court.  Without 
an intermediary, the court would lose access to an MLS witness (or, 
worse, an MLS defendant testifying for himself may lose linguistic 
competency).  This Comment does not intend to deride the value of 
the CDI’s work or to tread on its intricate nature.  Rather, it provides 
an alternative examining procedure that opens a window into this 
complex linguistic interaction.  The proposed procedure would allow 
parties to conduct a deposition-like direct and cross-examination in 
the absence of the jury but preserved on videotape.  Before presenting 
the videotaped testimony to the jury, the parties would have an oppor-
tunity to handle the court interpreters’ proposed interpretation much 
the same way courts currently handle proposed translations of written 
documents.  Thus, parties would be able to study the CDI’s interac-
tions with the MLS witness, identify errors, propose corrections, and 
have the courtroom interpreters record the accurate translation over 
incorrectly interpreted areas onto the videotape, all outside of the 
 
COKELY, AMERICAN SIGN LANGUAGE:  A TEACHER’S RESOURCE TEXT ON GRAMMAR AND 
CULTURE 214 (Clerc Books 1991) (1980). 
28 These errors can occur as omissions or modifications of a fact, the statement’s 
form, or the statement’s function.  Suppose, for example, that the attorney had, on 
cross-examination, asked the leading question, “Isn’t it true that you took the train 
home that night?” or the more coercive question, “You didn’t take the train home that 
night, did you?”  The ASL interpreter’s signed question would vary in accordance with 
ASL rules for constraining the type of acceptable answer and for conveying the para-
linguistic features of the questions form, but a CDI is unlikely to be able to preserve 
some of these formative features of the question when working with a nonlanguage.  
Her subsequent interaction with the MLS witness would not likely retain the control-
ling aspects of an interrogating attorney’s questions.  This is important because juries 
respond to verbal behaviors that follow, or go against, attempts to control.  See discus-
sion infra Part I. 
29 See discussion infra subsection II.B.2.b. 
30 See FED. R. EVID. 103; see also United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1348-49 
(2d Cir. 1990) (requiring claims of interpreter error to be raised soon after their oc-
currence); United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding “no objec-
tion at the time of trial, and no direct evidence . . . to indicate that there was any par-
ticular portion of the original trial that the defendants could not actually 
understand”). 
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jury’s presence and without risking an arbitrary waiver of objection 
because the errors were not timely identified during the actual witness 
interrogation.  In the end, the parties would have a better opportunity 
to identify, contest, and rectify errors, and the jury would see a more 
accurate interpretation of the testimony. 
Part I opens this Comment by describing the use of spoken and 
written English as primary tools for exercising control in the courtroom.  
This Part also reviews several studies that demonstrate the power of 
both the form and function of language, as illustrated through its ef-
fects on mock jurors and witnesses.  Part II briefly reviews the right to 
an interpreter and best practices for ensuring competency and accu-
racy.  It also discusses the critiques of interpreted courtroom dis-
course:  (1) the inability of interpreters to always bridge linguistic and 
cultural divides, and (2) the numerous studies and examples showing 
the interpreter’s tremendous power and influence, which can streng-
then, weaken, modify, or erroneously present the language of other 
courtroom actors.  Part III briefly reviews how courts handle non-
English written translations as evidence.  It then outlines the proposed 
framework for handling CDI-interpreted testimony, which adopts 
some best practices from document translation procedures.  The 
mere opportunity for these quality assurances may increase the court’s 
comfort with using a CDI to access a witness for whom a highly com-
petent ASL interpreter would not sufficiently pierce the linguistic veil. 
Linguistic accommodations are important for any party to litiga-
tion.  To illustrate certain principles, this Comment primarily ex-
amines practices and rights for MLS deaf defendants, but its proposed 
evidentiary accommodations are intended for any MLS deaf witness 
testifying in court. 
I.  THE POWER OF LANGUAGE IN THE COURTROOM 
A native English speaker may fail to appreciate the value of Eng-
lish proficiency—something so commonplace and familiar for most 
American-born adults—as a prerequisite for understanding and navi-
gating the American judicial system.  Most judges and attorneys are 
monolingual31 and most have spent their careers studying the intricacies 
 
31 See CARLA M. MATHERS, SIGN LANGUAGE INTERPRETERS IN COURT:  UNDER-
STANDING BEST PRACTICES 210 (2007) (“Most matters are not presided over by a bilin-
gual judge.”). 
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of spoken and written English.32  Written English is the predominant 
avenue for preserving court proceedings;33 accordingly, the denizens of 
courts are prolific writers of briefs, motions, orders, and opinions.34 
The English of the courtroom, however, at times appears designed 
to be both alien and alienating to native and nonnative English 
speakers.35  Despite a general sentiment that the American courtroom 
is open and accessible to all, the unique legal register of the cour-
troom is actually on the outer cusp of most native English speakers’ 
proficiencies.36  In fact, legal discourse often “is so complex linguisti-
cally that even bright college graduates who are not attorneys have to 
engage an attorney to explain it to them,” and “[e]ven lawyers disag-
ree on the meanings of documents in legal register.”37  This complexi-
ty goes beyond the use of longer or less common words; indeed, the 
words themselves may be plain and intelligible, but “the whole may 
not be understood in the sense that the recipient is not able to relate it 
to the [courtroom situation].”38 
Judges and attorneys are not oblivious to the control they can ex-
ercise by virtue of knowing and speaking the language of the legal sys-
 
32 See WILLIAM M. O’BARR, LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE:  LANGUAGE, POWER, AND STRAT-
EGY IN THE COURTROOM 15 (1982) (discussing David Mellinkoff’s idea that law is a 
“profession of words” and Frederick Philbrick’s notion that “[l]awyers are students of 
language by profession”); see also Marianne Constable, Reflections on Law as a Profession 
of Words (exploring the relationship between language and law within the legal profes-
sion and its attendant power implications), in JUSTICE AND POWER IN SOCIOLEGAL STU-
DIES 19, 27 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998). 
33 See 28 U.S.C. 753(b) (2006) (detailing how court reporters perform their duties, 
with a strong emphasis on recording proceedings in a written “transcript”).  A notable 
exception is video preservation used in Kentucky, which won a Ford Foundation award 
for innovation.  See WILLIAM E. HEWITT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, VIDEOTAPED 
TRIAL RECORDS:  EVALUATION AND GUIDE 54-57 (1990) (comparing the advantages and 
disadvantages of relying on videotaped proceedings during appellate review). 
34 It is telling that many appellate practitioners believe that the written brief out-
weighs the oral argument in importance unless it is an extremely close case, and oral 
argument will not often win the case but can lose it.  See, e.g., Gary L. Sasso, Appellate 
Oral Argument (“Some lawyers say you can’t win appeals in oral argument, but they 
think you can lose them there.”), in THE LITIGATION MANUAL 316, 316 (John G. Koeltl 
& John Kiernan eds., 1999). 
35 ALFRED PHILLIPS, LAWYERS’ LANGUAGE:  HOW AND WHY LEGAL LANGUAGE IS 
DIFFERENT 30-31 (2003). 
36 See Judith N. Levi, The Study of Language in the Judicial Process (reviewing empiri-
cal studies measuring how frequently jurors misunderstand those jury instructions that 
embed several features of legalistic language), in LANGUAGE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
3, 20-24 (Judith N. Levi & Anne Graffam Walker eds., 1990). 
37 Jean F. Andrews, McCay Vernon & Michele LaVigne, The Bill of Rights, Due 
Process and the Deaf Suspect/Defendant, 2007 J. INTERPRETATION 9, 15. 
38 PHILLIPS, supra note 35, at 43. 
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tem; in fact, it is how they ply their trade.39  Several legal and linguistic 
scholars have applied emerging knowledge about register, discourse 
analysis, speech acts, and stylistics to explore how courtroom partici-
pants can exercise linguistic power.40  These studies support the same 
basic conclusions:  “Form is communication; variations in form com-
municate different messages; and speakers manipulate form, but not 
always consciously, to achieve beneficial results.”41 
Susan Berk-Seligson reviews the use of register and the syntactic 
and discourse features of legal English to show how it lacks cohesion 
and is overly terse.42  She also reviews the work of William O’Barr, who 
extended Robin Lakoff’s ground-breaking sociolinguistics work43 on 
the incidents of powerful and powerless speech44 and correlated them 
to juror perceptions of witnesses.45  O’Barr found that hedges (e.g., 
 
39 See generally SANDRA BEATRIZ HALE, THE DISCOURSE OF COURT INTERPRETING ch. 
6 (2004) (exploring the ways in which power is manifested and exercised in courtroom 
interpretation).  Virtually any law library or large litigation department has shelves of 
practice guides on how to use language and interrogation successfully in front of ju-
ries.  E.g., ROBERT ARON, JULIUS FAST & RICHARD B. KLEIN, TRIAL COMMUNICATION 
SKILLS (2d ed., Clark Boardman Callaghan 1996) (1986); CELIA W. CHILDRESS, PERSU-
ASIVE DELIVERY IN THE COURTROOM (1995); JEFFREY L. KESTLER, QUESTIONING TECH-
NIQUES AND TACTICS (3d ed. 1999). 
40 See, e.g., JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, JUST WORDS:  LAW, LANGUAGE, 
AND POWER (2d ed. 2005); O’BARR, supra note 32; Levi, supra note 36.   
41 O’BARR, supra note 32, at 11. 
42 See SUSAN BERK-SELIGSON, THE BILINGUAL COURTROOM:  COURT INTERPRETERS 
IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 12-17 (1990) (describing Martin Joos’s register studies and 
Brenda Danet’s legal English studies to demonstrate the difficulty of comprehending 
legal language). 
43 See ROBIN LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND WOMAN’S PLACE (1975) (examining the posi-
tion of women in society through linguistic analysis of speech by and about women). 
44 Lakoff originally wrote in terms of women’s language, but O’Barr and others 
used the gender-neutral “powerful” and “powerless” nomenclature because the fea-
tures are by no means confined to a particular gender.  See William M. O’Barr & Bow-
man K. Atkins, “Women’s Language” or “Powerless Language”? (“[W]e would suggest that 
the phenomenon described by Lakoff would be better termed powerless language, a 
term which is more descriptive . . . and one which does not link it unnecessarily to the 
sex of a speaker.”), in WOMEN AND LANGUAGE IN LITERATURE AND SOCIETY 93, 104 
(Sally McConnel-Ginet, Ruth Borker & Nelly Furman eds., 1980).  Some consider this a 
well-intentioned but damaging neutralization of a feminist issue.  See, e.g., ALETTE OLIN 
HILL, MOTHER TONGUE, FATHER TIME 122 (1986) (finding that despite O’Barr and 
Atkins’s good intentions, they engage in an unwarranted neutralization of a traditional 
feminist issue by equating “women’s language” with “powerless language”).  I continue 
to adhere to O’Barr’s terminology.  In fact, John Earl Joseph noted that these power-
less features are less entwined with gender because they have recently “spread to be-
come normal features of the English of anyone under the age of twenty-five.”  JOHN E. 
JOSEPH, LANGUAGE AND POLITICS 83-84 (2006). 
45 See O’Barr & Atkins, supra note 44, at 104-109. 
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“kind of”), intensifiers (e.g., “really” and “very”), hesitations (e.g., 
“umm” and “uhh”), polite forms, questioning intonation, hypercor-
rect grammar (e.g., grammatical errors made while attempting to 
speak formally), fragmented testimony, and interruptions all led to 
statistically significant changes in juror perceptions of witnesses and 
questioning attorneys.46  Much of this linguistic control comes in the 
context of direct and cross-examination:  “With this repertoire of 
speech styles speakers can manipulate the impressions that others in 
the courtroom have of them and their interlocutors” by phrasing 
questions and answers in ways that make themselves more credible 
and their adversaries less credible.47 
The courtroom thus becomes a forum for competing narratives.  
Bernard Jackson found the courtroom trial to be a “complex piece of 
social action” with “a set of stories,” each purposefully crafted to suc-
ceed in the adversarial “contest between witness and cross-examining 
counsel.”48  Successful interrogating attorneys will orchestrate the mesh 
of multiple witness stories into a single story that “ring[s] true,” 49 avoid-
ing a fragmented form and instead creating a cohesive narrative 
 
46 O’BARR, supra note 32, at 61-87; see also Jeffrey D. Smith, The Advocate’s Use of So-
cial Science Research into Nonverbal and Verbal Communication:  Zealous Advocacy or Unethical 
Conduct?, 134 MIL. L. REV. 173, 178-82 (1991). 
47 BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 42, at 20, 22-25; see also HALE, supra note 39, ch. 5 
(analyzing interpreters’ translations of Spanish-speaking witnesses’ testimony to dem-
onstrate the importance of conveying the style of speech as well as context). 
48 Bernard S. Jackson, Narrative Models in Legal Proof, in NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL 
DISCOURSE:  A READER IN STORYTELLING AND THE LAW 158, 165 (David Ray Papke ed., 
1991).  As will become apparent in Section II.B, the interposition of an interpreter 
amid these competing discourses complicates the interpretation.  Debra Russell de-
scribes the conflicting goals of each party in an interpreted courtroom scenario: 
The Deaf witnesses wanted to present their perspectives on the events that led 
them to the court proceedings.  [The prosecuting attorneys] wanted to lead the 
witnesses through their narrative and to emphasize the critical details of the 
case.  Alternatively, the defense lawyer wanted to cast doubt on the witnesses 
[sic] credibility and to downplay some of the events being relayed by the witness. 
Debra Russell, Interpreting Strategies in Legal Discourse 2 (May 2004) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.criticallink.org/files/CL4_Russell.pdf.  Russell 
goes on to show how legal interpreters provided or omitted narrative and context 
markers in ways that altered the cohesion of the questioning and subsequent testimo-
ny.  Id. at 4-7. 
49 Jackson, supra note 48, at 160-61 (finding support in socio-linguistic and social 
psychology research for the notion that particular speech acts in the narrative model 
directly relate to the perceived plausibility of witness testimony). 
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form.50  Speech that enhances a seamless narrative leads to perceived 
credibility: 
Truth is a function not of discourse, but of the enunciation of discourse.  
If we cannot judge whether the semantic content of stories (“factual” or 
“fictional”) is true, we can at least judge who we think is telling the truth, 
in the sense of most adequately persuading us that s/he is fulfilling the 
sincerity conditions of the act of making a truth-claim.  We make such 
judgments by narrativising the pragmatics of the act of enunciation.  
There, we have to ask who has succeeded best in the activity of persuasion, 
and we have narrative models to guide us in making such judgments.
51
 
Jurors decide between these competing narratives using their 
“everyday” judgment about social signs and symbols, including how 
the parties portray themselves linguistically, to arrive at what they be-
lieve is a fair outcome.52  Indeed, some jury instructions explicitly di-
rect jurors to measure witness credibility using the same tests of truth-
fulness they apply in their own everyday affairs.53  In the end, “a 
difference in control over the presentation of evidence and argu-
ments . . . [leads] to a difference in judged procedural fairness.”54  
Beyond function, the forms of the attorney’s questions and the wit-
ness’s responses are themselves a battleground. 
Judges and attorneys are also accustomed to knowing the content of 
all language used in the open court, which they can monitor in their 
native tongue.  The presence of interpreters disrupts that comfort be-
cause it moves a portion of the courtroom’s dialogue behind a linguistic 
 
50 As part of that effort, interrogating attorneys attempt to keep adverse witnesses’ 
answers short.  Indeed, the length of a narrative answer signals a measure of an attor-
ney’s control over an adverse witness.  See BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 42, at 119. 
51 BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT, AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE 2 (1988). 
52 See E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Authorities 
(finding that jurors are more comfortable using familiar nonlegal standards for credibili-
ty), in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 177, 187 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998). 
53 Compare 1 N.C. CONFERENCE OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES, NORTH CAROLINA 
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL CASES 101.15 (2008) (“You are the sole judges 
of the credibility of each witness.  You must decide for yourselves whether to believe 
the testimony of any witness.  You may believe all, or any part, or none of that testimo-
ny.  In determining whether to believe any witness you should use the same tests of 
truthfulness which you apply in your everyday lives.”), with ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, PAT-
TERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) 11 (2005) (“In deciding whether you believe 
or do not believe any witness I suggest that you ask yourself a few questions:  Did the 
witness impress you as one who was telling the truth? . . . Did the witness seem to have a 
good memory? . . . Did the witness appear to understand the questions clearly and an-
swer them directly?” (emphasis added)). 
54 Lind, supra note 52, at 179. 
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veil.55  For example, as Section II.B illustrates, an interpreter may blur 
perceptions about the form of language by adjusting the legal register, 
by adding or omitting characteristics of powerful or powerless language, 
and by eliciting suspicion and feelings of lack of control in those who 
are accustomed to controlling courtroom discourse.  This is also why 
interpreters must not converse privately with witnesses.56 
These concerns are magnified when courtroom participants learn 
or suspect that the CDI is not strictly adhering to the form of the ques-
tion.  Courts presume that messages traveling through the interpreter 
retain both their form and function—that is, interpreters are not 
modifying the messages in any way beyond whatever interpretive 
transfers are required between languages.  However, as demonstrated 
by the previous example of the MLS witness testifying about being at 
the train station,57 this is frequently not the case. 
The next Part discusses how courts can increase assurance that 
messages traveling through a single interpreter are “legally equiva-
lent,” as that term is later defined.58  However, even these checks on 
interpreter accuracy are difficult to recreate when handling MLS wit-
ness testimony.  Thus, we turn next to the use of these interpreters 
and the effect they have on language interaction in open court. 
II.  TODAY’S SIGN LANGUAGE INTERPRETERS IN THE COURTROOM 
Non-English-speaking individuals have only recently begun to re-
ceive greater accommodations in American courts.  This Part first dis-
cusses the historical roots of courtroom interpreters.  It then reviews 
best practices for sign language interpreters in the courtroom, col-
lected primarily from the works of Carla Mathers59 and Michele La-
 
55 See LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 918 (noting that most trial judges cannot 
tell whether a continuously working interpreter is interpreting accurately or helping 
the non–English speaker understand the proceedings).  Attorneys are in no better po-
sition, even if they are themselves proficient in the interpreted language because their 
attention is to other matters and not to the accuracy of the interpretation.  Id. at 920.  
Alexandre Dumas captured the general sentiment about discomfort with using an in-
terpreter as an intermediary.  He applauded a smuggler captain’s multilingualism, which 
“spared him the necessity of employing interpreters, —persons always troublesome and 
frequently indiscreet.”  1 ALEXANDRE DUMAS, THE COUNT OF MONTE CRISTO 201 (1941). 
56 See MATHERS, supra note 25, at 92 (“[A]ll interaction between the deaf witness 
and the interpreters must be mediated through the court.”). 
57 See supra Introduction. 
58 See infra Section II.B. 
59 See generally MATHERS, supra note 31. 
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Vigne and McCay Vernon,60 including a discussion of the use of CDIs to 
provide a bridge to MLS deaf participants.  These best practices strive to 
make the interpretive process transparent in order to preserve the inte-
grity of the proceedings and to provide full accommodations to non–
English speakers.  This Part then uses the research of Susan Berk-
Seligson61 to show that even these best practices might not be enough. 
A.  Constitutional and Statutory Rights to an Interpreter 
The United States Constitution does not mention the rights of 
linguistic minorities.62  In the legal setting, “[l]ess affluent minorities 
simply suffer” because they are linguistically and culturally distanced 
from the specialized discourse of law enforcement and the cour-
troom.63  The right to an interpreter first emerged and is most en-
trenched within the context of a criminal defendant’s right to testify on 
his own behalf,64 his right to confront witnesses,65 his right to the assis-
tance of counsel,66 and his overall due process rights to a fair trial.67 
 
60 See generally LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4. 
61 See generally BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 42. 
62 See MATHERS, supra note 31, at 19 (“It should not be surprising that the Consti-
tution is silent regarding the rights of linguistic minorities given the traditional ethno-
centric character of the country.”). 
63 Robert W. Shuy, The Language Problems of Minorities in the Legal Setting, in LAN-
GUAGE AND THE LAW IN DEAF COMMUNITIES 1, 1 (Ceil Lucas ed., 2003). 
64 The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any crim-
inal case to be a witness against himself.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Supreme Court 
has held that this right against self-incrimination “is fulfilled only when an accused is 
guaranteed the right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered ex-
ercise of his own will.”  Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 53 (1987) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 229 (1971) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (recognizing a defendant’s choice to testify in his own defense as an exercise 
of his Fifth Amendment constitutional privilege). 
65 The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. VI.  This right grew from a long common law history supporting the 
right to cross-examine one’s accusers in court.  See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 43-50 (2004) (summarizing the evolution of the right to confront one’s accusers, 
which “is a concept that dates back to Roman times”). 
66 The Sixth Amendment also provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. VI; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-89 (1984) (mea-
suring attorney conduct against a standard of “reasonable effective assistance” and the 
degree to which the attorney consults with the defendant regarding litigation decisions). 
67 The Supreme Court described the denial of Fourteenth Amendment due 
process standards in criminal proceedings as “the failure to observe that fundamental 
fairness essential to the very concept of justice.  In order to declare a denial of it we 
must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained 
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The leading case on the right to an interpreter, United States ex rel. 
Negron v. New York,68 sparked a change in the legal landscape for lin-
guistic minorities.69  In Negron, a Spanish-speaking defendant was tried 
and convicted of murder in state court without having an interpreter 
for most of the trial.70  The Second Circuit granted Negron’s writ of 
habeas corpus because “[t]o Negron, most of the trial must have been 
a babble of voices.”71  Without being given the opportunity to contem-
poraneously understand the testimony of adverse witnesses, Negron 
could not exercise his Sixth Amendment right to confront them.72  
Even more fundamentally, the court found that 
[c]onsiderations of fairness, the integrity of the fact-finding process, and 
the potency of our adversary system of justice forbid that the state should 
prosecute a defendant who is not present at his own trial . . . [a]nd it is 
equally imperative that every criminal defendant—if the right to be 
present is to have meaning—possess sufficient present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.
73
 
Most federal courts that find a constitutional right to an interpre-
ter do so through the second basis asserted in Negron:  the due process 
right to a fundamentally fair trial.74  Some federal courts have also 
found the right to an interpreter protected under one’s Sixth 
Amendment right to confront witnesses, akin to the argument made 
 
of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.”  Lisenba v. California, 314 
U.S. 219, 236 (1941). 
68 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970). 
69 See MATHERS, supra note 31, at 23 (noting that in the wake of Negron, the “legal 
landscape changed dramatically”). 
70 See Negron, 434 F.2d at 388 (noting that the only courtroom use of an interpreter 
was by the prosecution for translating Negron’s and two other Spanish-speaking wit-
nesses’ testimonies into English).  The prosecution’s attorney did testify that she spent 
between ten and twenty minutes during two brief recesses to summarize for Negron the 
content of the English-language testimony, a fact that gave the appellate court little so-
lace because twelve of the prosecution’s fourteen witnesses, including the most damaging 
witnesses, testified in English.  The court held that Negron had no opportunity to know 
of the testimony while the trial was in progress, and the court further noted that testimo-
ny summaries were woefully inadequate to help Negron in his defense.  Id. at 388-89. 
71 Id. at 388. 
72 Id. at 389. 
73 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
74 JAMES G. CONNELL, III, & RENE L. VALLADARES, CULTURAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL 
DEFENSE § 2.3(a) & n.42 (2000).  For a more detailed analysis of this and the following 
constitutional arguments, see LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 888-92; Jeffrey B. 
Wood, Comment, Protecting Deaf Suspects’ Right to Understand Criminal Proceedings, 75 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 166, 169-71 (1984).  
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in Negron,75 or under one’s Fifth Amendment right to testify on one’s 
own behalf.76  Neither the Sixth Amendment right to confront wit-
nesses77 nor the right to effective assistance of counsel,78 however, ap-
ply to non-English-speaking litigants in civil proceedings. 
In state courts and in some cases in federal courts, the right to an 
interpreter is less clearly protected in statute and policy.79  Neither the 
Federal Court Interpreters Act80 nor the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 199081 requires federal courts to provide interpreters for all 
deaf participants in judicial proceedings.  Following Negron, Congress 
passed the Federal Court Interpreters Act to apply only to those judi-
cial proceedings instituted by the United States.82  The presiding officer 
 
75 See, e.g., United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973) (“Clearly, the 
right to confront witnesses would be meaningless if the accused could not understand 
their testimony, and the effectiveness of cross-examination would be severely ham-
pered.”); see also United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470-71 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting a 
defendant’s constitutional right to an interpreter when necessary to allow him to con-
front witnesses).  See generally Charles M. Grabau & Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Protecting 
the Rights of Linguistic Minorities:  Challenges to Court Interpretation, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
227, 263-64 (1996) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses is meaning-
less if the defendant cannot understand their testimony.”). 
76 See, e.g., United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that a Spanish-speaking defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to testify on his own be-
half was infringed when the court, learning that the defendant had been in America 
for two decades, dismissed his interpreter and told the defendant to “try it” in English); 
Carrion, 488 F.2d at 14 (“If the defendant takes the stand in his own behalf, but has an 
imperfect command of English, there exists the additional danger that he will either mi-
sunderstand crucial questions or that the jury will misconstrue crucial responses.”). 
77 See, e.g., Carty v. Nelson, 426 F.3d 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation does not attach in civil commitment proceed-
ings.”); Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1352 (7th Cir. 1997) (“There is 
no absolute right of confrontation in civil cases.”); United States v. 6109 Grubb Road, 
886 F.2d 618, 621 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff cannot invoke a Sixth 
Amendment right to confront witnesses in a forfeiture proceeding). 
78 See, e.g., Barkauskas v. Lane, 946 F.2d 1292, 1294 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel do not apply in habeas actions, which are civ-
il in nature); Glick v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 536, 541 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that 
claims of ineffective assistance of appointed counsel in a civil case are more appro-
priately remedied through a malpractice suit against the attorney); MacCuish v. United 
States, 844 F.2d 733, 735-36 (10th Cir. 1988) (denying a plaintiff’s request for a new 
trial because her claim “confuses this civil case with a Sixth Amendment based claim” 
for ineffective assistance of counsel (citation omitted)); Sanchez v. USPS, 785 F.2d 
1236, 1237 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[W]e now expressly hold that the sixth amendment right 
to effective assistance of counsel does not apply to civil litigation.”). 
79 See Grabau & Gibbons, supra note 75, at 262-63 & n.147.  
80 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (2006). 
81 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006). 
82 See 28 U.S.C. § 1827(a) (“The Director . . . shall establish a program to facilitate 
the use of certified and otherwise qualified interpreters in judicial proceedings insti-
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must provide an interpreter when a party or witness speaks only or 
primarily another language or is deaf and has a language barrier that 
inhibits a party’s comprehension of the proceedings, a party’s com-
munication with counsel, or a witness’s comprehension of questions 
and delivery of testimony.83  In the context of hearing impairments, 
the courts retain discretion to determine if the impairment is signifi-
cant enough to inhibit the communication.84  The Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 contains no title that applies to the federal ju-
diciary, though Title II does require state and local courts to provide 
and pay for auxiliary aids and services for deaf participants in state 
courts.85  Most states, under their own statutes, independently require 
interpreters in both civil and criminal courts.86  In federal courts, deaf 
 
tuted by the United States.”); Hrubec v. United States, 734 F. Supp. 60, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 
1990); MATHERS, supra note 31, at 26-30. 
83 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1).  The presiding judicial officer must “inquire as to the 
need for an interpreter when a [party] has difficulty with English.”  Valladares v. Unit-
ed States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1565 (11th Cir. 1989). 
84 See CONNELL & VALLADARES, supra note 74, § 2.3(b); see also Valladares, 871 F.2d 
at 1566 (holding that the defendant’s failure to object to alleged interpreter incompe-
tence for not providing continuous interpretation was fatal to his claim that the inter-
preter inhibited his communication); United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470-72 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (finding that the court’s borrowing of the defendant’s table interpreter for 
witness interpretation was within the court’s discretion and did not inhibit the defen-
dant’s ability to communicate with counsel); Luna v. Black, 772 F.2d 448, 451 (8th Cir. 
1985) (granting trial courts discretion in meeting a defendant’s interpreter needs, but 
not requiring independent court action when the court is not put on notice about a 
defendant’s language needs); United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1210 (5th Cir. 
1980) (noting that absence of an interpreter at a defendant’s trial does not support the 
defendant’s claim for violation of the Federal Court Interpreters Act unless the failure 
inhibited his comprehension of the proceedings or limited his ability to confront wit-
nesses).  See generally Grabau & Gibbons, supra note 75, at 263-64 (discussing the Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation and the importance of effective communication 
among the client, her attorney, and the tribunal at all stages of the trial).   
85 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12132 (requiring all state and local public entities to 
provide auxiliary aids and services to qualified individuals with a disability, thus enabl-
ing them to participate in and enjoy the benefits of public services, programs, and ac-
tivities); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.160 (2008) (containing relevant implementing regula-
tions for the provision of auxiliary aids to ensure effective communication). 
86 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-131 (LexisNexis 2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
242(A) (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-10-127(c) (1999); CAL. EVID. CODE § 754(b) 
(West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-204 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-245 
(West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8907 (2009); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1902 (Lexis-
Nexis 2008); FLA. STAT. § 90.6063(2) (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-102(a) (1995); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-205 (2004); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-1402 (West 2003); 
IND. CODE. ANN. § 4-21.5-3-16 (West 2002); IOWA CODE § 622B.2 (2009); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 75-4351 (1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30A.410 (LexisNexis 1998); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 15:270(A) (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 48-A(2)(a) (2002); MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-114(a) (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, 
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participants who do not qualify for interpreter services under constitu-
tional case law or the Federal Court Interpreters Act must instead turn 
to policy established by the Judicial Conference of the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts to receive interpreters.87 
Deaf defendants and witnesses are certainly not homogenous, and 
courts are realizing the benefits of flexibility.88  Providing a CDI or in-
termediary interpreter is one of these flexible approaches,89 and some 
 
§ 92A (2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 393.503 (2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.32 (West 
2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-303 (West 1999); MO. REV. STAT. § 476.753 (2008); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-503 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-153 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 50.051 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-A:2 (LexisNexis 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 34:1-69.10 (West 2000); N.M. STAT. § 38-9-3 (2009); N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 390 
(McKinney 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8B-2 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-33-02 (2006); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2311.14 (LexisNexis 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1278 
(West 2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 45.285 (2007); 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 583 (West 
2008); R.I GEN. LAWS § 8-5-8 (Supp. 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-27-15 (2005); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 19-3-10 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-211(b) (2000); TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.31(a) (Vernon 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-202 (2008); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 332 (Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-384.1, 19.2-164.1 
(2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 2.42.120 (2009); W. VA. CODE §§ 5-14A-3, 57-5-7 (2006); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 885.37, .38 (West Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-109 (2009). 
 The state statutes appear similar on their face, but their contours vary.  There is 
ample variation in the categories of deaf persons to whom the laws apply (plaintiff, de-
fendant, witness, juror, attorney, and deaf parent whose child is involved in a legal 
proceeding) and in the type of judicial proceedings to which the laws apply (civil, 
criminal, and administrative).  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(A) (providing 
interpreters for any witness, complainant, defendant, or attorney in any civil or crimi-
nal matter); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-10-127(c) (providing sign language interpreters for 
any state bilingual proceeding or hearing involving a hearing impaired individual); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-102(a) (1995) (providing interpreters to any deaf party, witness 
to any proceeding, or parent whose child is a party or witness to any agency proceed-
ing); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-1402 (West 2003) (providing interpreters for any 
deaf person who is a party, witness, or juror to a proceeding). 
87 See 1 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL POLI-
CIES AND PROCEDURES, ch. III, pt. H, at 37-39 (2001).  California provides a state-level 
example of this type of process.  The California Supreme Court explicitly held that no 
provision of its state constitution or statutes required courts to provide interpreters for 
non-English-speaking parties in civil cases.  Jara v. Mun. Court, 578 P.2d 94, 95-97 (Cal. 
1978).  The Judicial Council of California reacted to this holding by increasing its in-
terpreter services for civil litigants, and the California legislature also provided for in-
terpreters in certain civil cases.  See Nicholas P. Tsukamaki, Comment, Legislative Incon-
sistency:  California’s Good Cause Statutory Exceptions as a Step Back in the Effort to Improve 
Court Access for Non-English Speaking Civil Litigants, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 69, 71-72 (2006). 
88 See, e.g., People v. Vandiver, 468 N.E.2d 454, 458 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (“Testimo-
ny of a deaf witness may be secured by whatever means are necessary and best adapted 
to the case, which is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.”). 
89 This is not an ironclad right, as noted supra, because the judge often retains 
broad discretion to determine whether a semilingual party can be adequately accom-
modated, over that party’s objection, using only hearing interpreters.  See, e.g., Linton 
v. State, 275 S.W.3d 493, 499-502, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (upholding the trial 
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states have even enacted provisions supporting their use.90  One court, 
while commending the trial court’s use of a CDI alongside the ASL in-
terpreter, noted that any claim of linguistic incompetence is actually a 
claim of the judicial system’s incompetence to constitutionally try the 
MLS defendant.91  However, CDIs in the courtroom (or lack thereof 
when necessary) have generated only scant mention in reported cases.92  
CDIs themselves remain a small and elite corps of interpreting profes-
sionals, perhaps in part because their professional credentialing proce-
dure is relatively new and because their services are only slowly growing 
in demand.93  The Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, the national cer-
tifying body for professional sign language interpreters, reports only 91 
CDIs compared to over 8200 certified hearing interpreters.94 
 
court’s denial of a CDI, despite testimony by an expert witness that the defendant 
missed twenty to twenty-five percent of the content, because the “best” interpretive ser-
vice is not constitutionally required as long as the defendant understands the nature 
and objective of the proceedings and can assist in the defense). 
90 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(F); CAL. EVID. CODE § 754(g); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 13-90-206 (2008); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1905 (LexisNexis 2008); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1521(6)(C) (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A; MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 393.503(5); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-505 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-154 
(2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:1-69.9 (West 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-27-15; WASH. 
REV. CODE § 2.42.140(3) (2009). 
91 See People v. Rivera, 480 N.Y.S.2d 426, 433 & n.11 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (citing People v. 
Lang, 325 N.E.2d 305, 309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975), for an example of a defendant viewed as 
incompetent to stand trial, where a more accurate view would be to understand that it is 
the judicial system that is actually incompetent to constitutionally try the defendant). 
92 See, e.g., In re Wickman, No. 270326, 2007 WL 162573, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 
23, 2007); Linton, 275 S.W.3d at 509.  However, courts are not entirely insensitive to 
the needs of MLS deaf defendants, even when a CDI is not provided.  In State v. Wright, 
for example, the court denied the defendant’s request for consecutive interpretation 
and a CDI during the entire trial, but it did provide a multitude of accommodations, 
described in Section II.B., including three proceedings interpreters, two table inter-
preters, real-time captioning, complete videotaping of each day’s interpreted proceed-
ings available to the defendant on DVDs, and a CDI to communicate with counsel be-
fore the proceedings.  768 N.W.2d 512, 518 (S.D. 2009). 
93 See Dennis Cokely, Shifting Positionality:  A Critical Examination of the Turning Point 
in the Relationship of Interpreters and the Deaf Community (discussing the emergence of the 
CDI profession and its struggles to gain credence), in SIGN LANGUAGE INTERPRETING 
AND INTERPRETER EDUCATION:  DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 1, 19-21 
(Marc Marschark, Rico Peterson & Elizabeth A. Winston eds., 2005). 
94 See Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, https://www.rid.org/acct-app/
index.cfm?action=search.members (last visited Jan. 15, 2010) (follow “CDI” under 
“Certificates”; then follow “Find Members”).  
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B.  Best Practices for Sign Language Interpretation in the Courtroom 
The primary goal of a sign language interpreter in the courtroom 
is to provide language access to all courtroom participants while pre-
serving the integrity of that language.  Under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, an interpreter acts as an expert who swears an oath “to 
make a true translation.”95  An interpreter’s oath, most often a prom-
ise to interpret impartially96 and accurately,97 binds the interpreter to 
the court.98  Nevertheless, because the interpreter “may be the only 
person in the courtroom with a full command of both languages be-
ing used,” she can knowingly or unknowingly influence the proceed-
ings.99  Several best practices help protect the integrity of the language 
used in the courtroom.100 
 
95 FED. R. EVID. 604.  Courts may also secure interpreters under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 706, which allows a court “to retain experts for its own benefit to advise and 
consult with in areas in which the court is lacking information.”  MATHERS, supra note 
31, at 73.   
96 Impartiality generally entails disclosing to the court during voir dire all prior 
interactions with any party and maintaining objectivity throughout the interpretation.  
See MATHERS, supra note 31, at 76-77; see also Lynn W. Davis & William E. Hewitt, Les-
sons in Administering Justice:  What Judges Need to Know About the Requirements, Role, and 
Professional Responsibilities of the Court Interpreter, 1 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 121, 132 (1994) 
(listing the kinds of questions a judge may ask during voir dire to establish the inter-
preter’s impartiality, which range from the interpreter’s own experience to any poten-
tial conflicts of interest).  Although no per se rule bars participation of an interpreter 
who has been involved with the prosecution, CONNELL & VALLADARES, supra note 74, 
§ 2.5(e), interpreter objectivity can be a serious concern when the interpreter worked 
in an investigatory capacity or became privy to privileged communications.  See MATH-
ERS, supra note 31, at 105 (identifying this as a “sequencing” concern); Grabau & Gib-
bons, supra note 75, at 285-86 (explaining why an interpreter should not interpret for 
more than one party at a trial). 
97 For example, the Southern District of New York requires the following oath of 
its interpreters:  “Do you solemnly swear (or affirm) to interpret these proceedings tru-
ly, fairly and impartially, to the best of your ability, so help you God?”  SDNY Interpre-
ters Office:  Interpreter’s Oath, http://sdnyinterpreters.org/?page=oath.html (last vi-
sited Jan. 15, 2010). 
98 This occurs within the paradigm of the interpreter as an expert witness.  Some 
courts treat the interpreter as an officer of the court, and her allegiance to the court is 
more pervasive.  See MATHERS, supra note 31, at 74 & n.3, 79-82. 
99 ALICIA B. EDWARDS, THE PRACTICE OF COURT INTERPRETING 63 (1995). 
100 These subsections discuss only selected best practices that most relate to the 
integrity of the interpretation, the interpreter’s ability to preserve form and function 
in the target language, and incidents of working with multiple interpreters and CDIs in 
the courtroom.  For a more comprehensive summary of best practices for sign lan-
guage interpreters in a legal environment, see KELLIE STEWART ET AL., NAT’L CONSOR-
TIUM OF INTERPRETER EDUC. CTRS., BEST PRACTICES:  AMERICAN SIGN LANGUAGE AND 
ENGLISH INTERPRETATION WITHIN LEGAL SETTINGS (2009). 
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1.  Staffing the Courtroom with Competent Interpreters 
When a court learns that it will need interpreters to assist non-
English-speaking participants, it must address a question of staffing.  
Sometimes, a single interpreter can provide all the necessary accom-
modations, but the situation is not always so simple.101  A typical cour-
troom generally requires three types of interpreters:  (1) a proceed-
ings interpreter (for all remarks in open court and testimony of 
English-speaking witnesses), (2) a defense or table interpreter (for 
privileged communications with one’s attorney and for out-of-court 
interpreting), and (3) a witness interpreter (for non–English witness 
testimony).102  The court may not need a separate interpreter for each 
function because a single interpreter can often fulfill multiple roles 
when those roles do not conflict.103  However, a single interpreter may 
be insufficient to staff even a single function, such as when a CDI is 
required for working with an MLS deaf person or when the duration 
of the assignment requires that interpreters be available to relieve 
each other for reasons of mental104 or physical fatigue.105 
 
101 See MATHERS, supra note 31, at 82-105 (reviewing appropriate staffing for both 
sign language and spoken language interpreters for a variety of situations). 
102 Id. at 84-85; see also STEWART ET AL., supra note 100, at 24-26 (detailing best 
practices for staffing legal assignments). 
103 For example, if the defendant is a non–English speaker using a spoken lan-
guage interpreter, a single interpreter can sit next to the defendant and quietly interp-
ret for him all of the proceedings.  This same interpreter can serve as the defendant’s 
interpreter for private conversations with his attorney.  See United States v. Bennett, 
848 F.2d 1134, 1141 (11th Cir. 1988) (implying that the requirement for separate in-
terpreters is wasteful when a single interpreter can appropriately perform multiple 
functions).  But problems may arise if the court borrows this interpreter for work with 
a testifying witness, which would leave the defendant without a proceedings interpreter 
or a table interpreter.  The court in People v. Aguilar struck down this type of borrowing 
in California because it denied the defendant access to testimony and counsel at “mo-
ments crucial to the defense—when evidentiary rulings and jury instructions are given 
by the court [and] when damaging testimony is being introduced.”  677 P.2d 1198, 
1201 (Cal. 1984); see also Grabau & Gibbons, supra note 75, at 285 (arguing that a de-
fendant is deprived of her constitutional rights when she loses access to the defense 
interpreter).  However, intermittent borrowing may be permissible when it does not 
significantly interfere with linguistic access.  See United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470-
71 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that a brief borrowing between the table and witness func-
tions did not infringe on defendant’s right to assistance from counsel). 
104 Several studies have shown that interpreters suffer “a marked loss in the accu-
racy of the interpretation” after around thirty minutes of sustained interpreting, and 
one study showed that they often appear unaware of the loss in accuracy.  See STEWART 
ET AL., supra note 100, at 18-19 (collecting the results of studies on accuracy in pro-
longed simultaneous interpreting). 
105 See Grabau & Gibbons, supra note 75, at 296 (addressing interpreter fatigue and 
burnout).  Injury from overuse is a particular concern for sign language interpreters.  
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Increasing the number of interpreters, though, is not helpful if 
they lack the competency to interpret accurately.  Courts usually eva-
luate an interpreter’s competence through a voir dire process that is 
derived from the hearings on qualifications for other expert wit-
nesses,106 but this evaluation can be problematic.  An interpreter may 
have the necessary credentials, but linguistic differences such as di-
alects and regional variations may make the interpreter a poor fit for 
the non–English speaker.107  In the prominent Kansas interpreting 
case of State v. Van Pham, defendants wanted to use their own inter-
preter, not the court’s proceedings interpreter, when the defendants 
testified in court.108  The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the lower 
court was within its rights to refuse to allow the defendants to chal-
lenge the court’s interpreter and use their own interpreter because 
they accepted the court’s interpreter at the onset of the case; the de-
fendants’ attempt to reserve their right to challenge the court’s ap-
pointment of its interpreter during voir dire did not help them suc-
ceed.109 
The Van Phams’ concern, of course, was that they could not ascer-
tain the qualifications of the interpreter and the interpreter’s “fit” 
with their language style before being asked by the court to accept or 
reject the interpreter.  Voir dire of the interpreter may show the in-
terpreter’s extensive qualifications, but whether the specific interpre-
ter is a competent linguistic match with a defendant’s particular di-
alect is another question.  Courts, however, widely rely on voir dire 
before anyone in the court has actually witnessed the interpreter’s 
 
See Alice J. Baker, A Model Statute to Provide Foreign-Language Interpreters in the Ohio Courts, 
30 U. TOL. L. REV. 593, 616 (1999) (noting the additional fatigue factor inherent in 
sign language interpreting); Jo Anne Simon, The Use of Interpreters for the Deaf and the 
Legal Community’s Obligation to Comply with the A.D.A., 8 J.L. & HEALTH 155, 191 (1994) 
(justifying the use of team interpreters to avoid fatigue and strain that affect interpre-
ter accuracy); Self-Care for Interpreters:  Prevention and Care of Repetitive Strain Injuries, 
STANDARD PRACTICE PAPER (Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, Alexandria, Va.), 
2007, available at http://www.rid.org/UserFiles/File/pdfs/Standard_Practice_Papers/
Drafts_June_2006/Self-Care_SPP.pdf. 
106 MATHERS, supra note 31, at 77-79.  For sample voir dire questions for both sign 
language interpreters and CDIs, see Simon, supra note 105, at 199.  
107 See Randall T. Shepard, Access to Justice for People Who Do Not Speak English, 40 IND. 
L. REV. 643, 645-46 (2007) (“It is difficult even for someone familiar with a given lan-
guage to distinguish the language’s many dialects, and even more difficult for judges to 
distinguish between dialects or recognize the need for a different translation.”). 
108 675 P.2d 848 (Kan. 1984). 
109 Id. at 861-62.  The court did address objections to specific mistranslations as 
they occurred later in the trial. 
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skills.110  This approach has been under attack for years.  Constitution-
ally, a mere “warm body” is likely insufficient unless she “plays a role 
necessary to ensure that the proceedings are fair.”111  Suggested best 
practices include permitting only certified sign language interpreters,112 
allowing a brief communications test,113 and limiting the court’s dis-
cretion in how it measures whether the interpreter is meeting the par-
ty’s communication needs.114  Parties also have a greater incentive to 
try to determine during the brief voir dire period whether the inter-
preter will be a good fit. 
Interpreter competence is particularly salient in the context of an 
MLS deaf adult.115  A certified interpreter, or even a team of certified 
interpreters, may lack competence to ensure effective communication 
with a deaf person lacking language skills.116  Thus, courts are turning 
with greater frequency to CDIs to help bridge the gap between an 
MLS deaf adult and the court.117  CDIs use gestures, mimes, drawings, 
and other tools to create, in a sense, an impromptu system to com-
 
110 See CONNELL & VALLADARES, supra note 74, § 2.5(b) (“In most instances, the 
interpreter should be sworn on the record at the beginning of the proceeding and qu-
alifications of the interpreter should be stated on the record at that time.”). 
111 United States ex rel. Thomas v. O’Leary, 856 F.2d 1011, 1015 (7th Cir. 1988).  
112 See LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 916 (“By certified, we mean an interpre-
ter who has received, at the minimum, a Certificate of Interpretation (CI) and Certifi-
cate of Transliteration (CT) from the RID, a Level 5 from the National Association of 
the Deaf, or a state equivalent.”). 
113 See Matthew S. Compton, Fulfilling Your Professional Responsibilities:  Representing a 
Deaf Client in Texas, 39 ST. MARY’S L.J. 819, 882-84 (2008) (suggesting that attorneys 
representing deaf clients should ask the court to conduct a brief communications test 
between the court-appointed interpreter and the client to see if they can successfully 
interact). 
114 See LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 914-16 (arguing that broad discretion is 
inappropriate because judges do not have the expertise to know what a nonnative Eng-
lish user is capable of understanding or not, and this cannot be easily divined by obser-
vations from the bench). 
115 See Jamie McAlister, Deaf and Hard-of-Hearing Criminal Defendants:  How You Gon-
na Get Justice If You Can’t Talk to the Judge?  26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 163, 181-85 (1994). 
116 See LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 879 (“Meaningful communication, with 
or without an interpreter, requires language and background information with which 
to share meaning.  The deaf person with minimal language skills lacks both.”).   
117 See Boudreault, supra note 6, at 331-33 (discussing the emergence of CDIs as 
facilitators to work with semilingual individuals); LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 
879-82 (discussing the recommendation that an interpreter use “sources that go far 
beyond traditional language” when interpreting for a deaf person with minimal lan-
guage skills); STEWART ET AL., supra note 100, at 19-20 (noting a survey finding that 
people with underdeveloped ASL skills, cognitive challenges, and delayed language 
benefitted from the use of CDIs).  
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municate.118  CDIs are valuable because they have “an uncanny ability 
to communicate concepts that elude even the most talented hearing 
interpreter . . . [and] are able to draw upon connections and exam-
ples that make sense only in the deaf world.”119 
Having a CDI, however, does not guarantee that the deaf person 
will be linguistically present.120  LaVigne and Vernon detail the case of 
Jesse, a semilingual deaf adult charged with sexual assault.121  A team 
of the most qualified interpreters, including a CDI, were unable to 
meet Jesse’s linguistic needs or help him understand his plea bar-
gain.122  In the words of Vernon, who testified at Jesse’s post-conviction 
competency hearing, “[y]ou can pantomime taking a shower; you can 
pantomime getting a haircut.  You can’t pantomime plea bargain.”123  
Indeed, the abstract concepts of the justice system make the CDI’s task 
even more complicated and time-consuming.124  However, whether the 
 
118 The Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, the predominant certifying agency 
for professional interpreters in the United States, has published a standard practice 
paper describing the benefits of a CDI in a variety of individuals.  See Use of a Certified 
Deaf Interpreter, STANDARD PRACTICE PAPER (Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf, Alex-
andria, Va.), 2007, available at http://www.rid.org/UserFiles/File/pdfs/120.pdf.  
119 LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 926. 
120 See Rob Hoopes, Trampling Miranda:  Interrogating Deaf Suspects (“The more dif-
ficult question is whether a Deaf person who has been provided an interpreter under-
stands her rights and, therefore, can avail herself of their protections to the same ex-
tent as a hearing American.  What effect does the level of interpreting competence 
have on the ability to interpret linguistically complex discourse such as the Miranda 
warning and police interrogation?”), in LANGUAGE AND THE LAW IN DEAF COMMUNI-
TIES, supra note 63, at 21, 22. 
121 LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 844-46.   
122 See id. at 902-13 (describing Jesse’s trial, communication style, and the legal ar-
guments surrounding the treatment of his case).  For another more recent example, 
see New Mexico v. Sanchez, No. 28,090, 2009 N.M. App. Unpub. LEXIS 157, at *1-2 
(App. June 29, 2009), in which two certified interpreters and two CDIs interrupted the 
proceedings to report to the judge their opinion that they could not provide linguistic 
access to an MLS deaf defendant on trial for driving while intoxicated.  The judge in-
itially threatened to jail the interpreters for contempt of court but, in the absence of 
any objection by the defendant, eventually permitted the defendant’s sixteen-year-old 
daughter to interpret.  Id. at *2-3.  Unfortunately, the trial court never specifically in-
quired about the degree of the defendant’s understanding.  Id. at *4. 
123 LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 913 (alteration in original) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
124 For example, some experts have opined that it could take five or six hours to 
convey the Miranda rights to a person of high intelligence who lacks cultural and lin-
guistic experience.  See McAlister, supra note 115, at 185 (“Because legal concepts do 
not exist in ASL, interpreting legal concepts to a deaf individual requires substantially 
more time than, for example, interpreting those legal concepts into another spoken 
language.”); Bonnie P. Tucker, Deaf Prison Inmates:  Time to Be Heard, 22 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1, 70-71 (1988) (analogizing a particular highly intelligent but culturally and lin-
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person is eventually determined to be linguistically incompetent does 
not affect the rationale for providing all necessary accommodations 
because it is this provision that helps, in part, to inform the court 
about the degree of incompetence. 
2.  Ensuring Interpreter Accuracy 
Even if the court is assured of an interpreter’s general compe-
tence, there remains the issue of the interpreter’s ongoing accuracy.  
Mathers cautions against assuming that the interpreter’s active en-
gagement in signing means that the deaf person understands the pro-
ceeding.125  This legal fiction, she warns, is dangerous because it leads 
the court into allowing the interpreters to “function in an unsuper-
vised parallel universe” while the court “ignore[s] the latent disas-
ter.”126  Many courts mistakenly assume that the interpreter is provid-
ing a word-for-word literal translation between languages, and they 
attempt to shore up the risk of error by leaning on the interpreter to 
“just tell him what I’m saying, word for word.”127  This assumption re-
 
guistically deficient deaf defendant “to a million dollar computer without an adequate 
program”).  A guilty plea waiver of a trial by jury represents another legal concept that 
does not lend itself to easy interpretation by CDIs.  Timothy Jaech, a noted educator 
for the deaf, prepared a videotaped instructional MLS version of such a plea, but it 
took thirty times longer than the spoken English version—and it even assumed the 
MLS defendant’s understanding of the basic concept of a jury, a concept that itself 
would take several hours to interpret.  See LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 881-82 
(describing Jaech’s tape and its reactions). 
125 MATHERS, supra note 31, at 180 (“Courts have not dealt with interpreting issues 
entirely honestly. . . . [They assume] [a]utomated, interpreters are switched ‘on,’ and 
the deaf person is transformed into one who can hear.”) 
126 Id.  See generally Holly Mikkelson, Verbatim Interpretation:  An Oxymoron, 
http://www.acebo.com/papers/verbatim.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2010) (noting the 
impossibility of verbatim interpretation of courtroom proceedings and stressing the 
need for interpreters to use good judgment in rendering the proceedings while retain-
ing meaning and style).  LaVigne and Vernon describe the legal fiction as “a pervasive 
belief within the legal system that if we put an interpreter in front of a deaf person, the 
interpreter will instantly (and perfectly) convert spoken language to the appropriate 
language for the deaf person and the communication problem will be solved, thereby 
freeing everyone from further worry or inquiry and allowing business to proceed as 
usual.”  LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 848.   
127 LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 869.  A similar incident occurred during 
the Nuremberg trial, revealing an entertaining example of both judicial misunders-
tanding and the problems inherent in trying to adhere to literal translations.  “[The 
judge chided an interpreter for too succinct an interpretation], saying, ‘Now look 
here, I want you to translate everything I say, exactly.  Do you understand?’  The interpre-
ter nodded, and the judge signalled to me to proceed, saying ‘Yes, Mr. Pine?[,’] whe-
reupon the interpreter said, ‘Ja, Herr Tannenbaum?’”  EYEWITNESSES AT NUREMBERG 
92-93 (Hilary Gaskin ed., 1990). 
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lies heavily on what several linguists have called the conduit metaphor, 
where words are mistakenly viewed as containers of meaning and 
where, if the words are accurately transferred from the speaker to the 
listener, the listener will be able to derive the intended meaning.128 
Rather than requiring actual or literal equivalence, the Federal 
Judicial Center seeks what it calls “legal equivalence.”129  A legally 
equivalent interpretation preserves both the form and the function of 
the source language because the interpreter must deliver, in the tar-
get language, “the original source material without editing, summariz-
ing, deleting, or adding while conserving the language level, style, 
tone, and intent.”130  The National Association of Judiciary Interpre-
ters and Translators enshrines this into the First Canon of its Code of 
Ethics and Professional Responsibilities: 
Source-language speech should be faithfully rendered into the target lan-
guage by conserving all the elements of the original message while ac-
commodating the syntactic and semantic patterns of the target language.  
The rendition should sound natural in the target language, and there 
 
 The Second and Eleventh Circuits have read a word-for-word translation require-
ment into the Federal Court Interpreters Act.  See United States v. Huang, 960 F.2d 
1128, 1135 (2d Cir. 1992) (“As a substantive matter, the [Federal Court Interpreters 
Act] generally requires ‘continuous word for word translation.’”); United States v. Jo-
shi, 896 F.2d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he general standard for the adequate 
translation of trial proceedings requires continuous word for word translation of every-
thing relating to the trial a defendant conversant in English would be privy to hear.”). 
128 See 1 RONALD W. LANGACKER, FOUNDATIONS OF COGNITIVE GRAMMAR 161-62 
(1987) (identifying the problem and proposing that “[i]nstead of regarding expres-
sions as containers for meaning, we must focus on the symbolic correspondence be-
tween a phonological and a semantic structure” (emphasis omitted)). 
129 See Susan Mather & Robert Mather, Court Interpreting for Signing Jurors:  Just 
Transmitting or Interpreting? (discussing written products of the Federal Judicial Center 
and the Federal Court Interpreter Certification Project), in LANGUAGE AND THE LAW IN 
DEAF COMMUNITIES, supra note 63, at 60, 70-71.  
130 ROSEANN DUEÑAS GONZÁLEZ, VICTORIA F. VÁSQUEZ & HOLLY MIKKELSON, FUN-
DAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION 16 (1991).  This emphasis on conserving “the 
form and content of the linguistic and paralinguistic elements of a discourse, includ-
ing all of the pauses, hedges, self-corrections, hesitations, and emotion as they are con-
veyed through tone of voice, word choice, and intonation” exists for the same reasons 
noted supra in text accompanying notes 41 through 54: 
It is important to remember that from the beginnings of judicial proceedings 
triers of fact (the judge or jury) have to determine the veracity of a witness’s 
message on the basis of an impression conveyed through the speaker’s de-
meanor.  The true message is often in how something is said rather than in 
what is said; therefore, the style of a message is as important as its content. 
Id.  In linguistic terms, the type of equivalence sought is often called semantic and 
pragmatic equivalence and includes culture and situational meaning.  See HALE, supra 
note 39, at 5-7. 
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should be no distortion of the original message through addition or omis-
sion, explanation or paraphrasing.  All hedges, false starts and repetitions 
should be conveyed; also, English words mixed into the other language 
should be retained, as should culturally-bound terms which have no direct 
equivalent in English, or which may have more than one meaning.  The 
register, style and tone of the source language should be conserved.
131
 
One technique used to ensure that interpreters have the time and 
ability to meet the high bar of legal equivalence is to require consecu-
tive interpreting for non–English witness testimony, regardless of 
whether the court allows simultaneous interpreting for other portions 
of the proceeding.132  A consecutive interpreter “listens to the totality 
of a speaker’s comments, or at least a significant passage, and then re-
constitutes the speech with the help of notes taken while listening.”133  
A simultaneous interpreter, on the other hand, renders the message 
in the target language while the speaker is generating the message.134  
The extra time and greater context available in consecutive interpret-
ing enhances its quality and accuracy—which is highly sought in wit-
ness interpretations—but because it may add considerable length to 
the trial, most courts then switch back to simultaneous interpreting 
 
131 NAT’L ASS’N OF JUDICIARY INTERPRETERS & TRANSLATORS, CODE OF ETHICS AND 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES Canon 1, available at  http://www.najit.org/
membership/NAJITcodeofethicsfinal.pdf; see also WILLIAM E. HEWITT, COURT INTER-
PRETATION:  MODEL GUIDES FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE IN THE STATE COURTS ch. 9 
(1995), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/wc/publications/Res_CtInte_ 
ModelGuidePub.pdf (presenting Canon 1 of the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility for Interpreters in the Judiciary, which describes the requirement for accuracy and 
completeness).  Nancy Frishberg has a similar emphasis on conveying the whole message, 
not just the singular words: 
Messages that are fraught with idiomatic phrases or proper names (of products, 
of places, of official roles) often have many built-in cultural assumptions.  Thus, 
accuracy means that the interpreter says as much as the sender of the message, 
but not more.  Accuracy also means giving the receiver the complete message, 
including the part carried by pauses, hesitations, or other silent or non-verbal 
signals.  The interpreter transmits the full message, not merely the words. 
FRISHBERG, supra note 2, at 65.  
132 See HOLLY MIKKELSON, INTRODUCTION TO COURT INTERPRETING 70-76 (2000) 
(discussing the need for consecutive and simultaneous interpreting at different stages 
of the trial because of differing needs of accuracy and speed); Debra Russell, Consecu-
tive and Simultaneous Interpreting (demonstrating that far fewer errors were made when 
interpreters used consecutive translating rather than simultaneous translating during 
direct testimony), in TOPICS IN SIGNED LANGUAGE INTERPRETING, supra note 6, at 135, 
152-55.  
133 RODERICK JONES, CONFERENCE INTERPRETING EXPLAINED 5 (1998). 
134 MIKKELSON, supra note 132, at 72-73. 
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for most other English-language portions of the proceeding.135  Simul-
taneous interpreting requires greater proficiency and better cognitive 
management skills in order for the interpreter to maintain the neces-
sary level of accuracy.136 
This discussion leads to two fundamental questions affecting the 
accuracy of the interpretation.  First, how effective are courtroom in-
terpreters in retaining the facts, form, and function of the source lan-
guage, even when interpreting consecutively?  Second, when the facts, 
form, or function are lost in translation, how do interpreters rectify 
the error?  The next two subsections address these issues. 
a.  Interpreter Ability to Retain Facts, Form, and Function 
The interpretive process is not perfect.  The highly nuanced and 
often highly charged language of the courtroom is not always available 
with crystal clarity after it has been processed through a linguistic me-
dium.  Errors of fact are perhaps the easiest errors to identify, but only 
if one is fluent in both languages and has adequate access to the 
source and target languages.  In courtroom interpreting, these errors 
typically include content the interpreter plainly omits (perhaps by 
missing it or misunderstanding and then altering it) and content the 
interpreter omits when summarizing segments of the discourse (per-
haps by leaving out a critical detail clearly provided in the source tes-
timony).137  This Comment refers to these types of errors as errors of 
fact, but it includes any errors that relate to the substance of the in-
terpretation.  For example, an interpreter who fails to correctly see a 
deaf witness attach a possessive marker to an object might inadvertent-
ly voice “I put her bag into my car” rather than the factually correct “I 
put her bag into her car.”  Or perhaps an interpreter transposes num-
 
135 Id. at 70-71.  Simultaneous interpretation has been described as “a speedy, 
pseudo-efficient interpretation” when compared to the greater accuracy that is achieva-
ble through consecutive interpreting; in other words, a shorter time frame usually leads 
to greater inaccuracy in the interpretation.  STEWART ET AL., supra note 100, at 14. 
136 MIKKELSON, supra note 132, at 73-76. 
137 Debra Russell identified the different rates of incidence for these types of er-
rors between consecutive and simultaneous interpreting in the courtroom.  See Russell, 
supra note 132, at 151-53 (finding empirically that consecutive interpreting was signifi-
cantly more accurate than simultaneous interpreting for three types of courtroom dis-
course).  Omission, however, is both a conscious and an unconscious strategy that in-
terpreters employ to cope with the interpretive process.  See Jemina Napier, Linguistic 
Features and Strategies of Interpreting:  From Research to Education to Practice, in SIGN LAN-
GUAGE INTERPRETING AND INTERPRETER EDUCATION:  DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 93, at 84, 94. 
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bers or misses a shift in tense.138  These can each lead to factual inac-
curacies in the interpretation. 
However, errors in form and function are also critical errors in the 
courtroom.  As Part I explains, the language of judges and lawyers of-
ten wields control.139  Susan Berk-Seligson found that court interpre-
ters often and unwittingly interfere with lawyers’ and judges’ attempts 
to ask well-designed questions in ways that change the verbal outcome 
of the witness’s answers.140  They do so because it is linguistically diffi-
cult to create a legally equivalent version that matches the source lan-
guage in both form and function.141  Berk-Seligson reviewed numerous 
interpreted courtroom proceedings142 and found a wealth of incidents 
where interpreters affected the verbal outcome of witness testimony.143  
Attorneys often exert control over witnesses through questioning and 
interrogation, particularly by controlling the range of acceptable an-
swers, applying certain tones, and modifying illocutionary force.144  In 
 
138 For a discussion of the effects of misinterpreted tense in courtroom testimony, 
see James Shepard-Kegl, Carol Neidle & Judy Kegl, Legal Ramifications of an Incorrect 
Analysis of Tense in ASL, 1995 J. INTERPRETATION 53, 58-68. 
139 See supra text accompanying notes 41-54. 
140 BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 42, at 22-24; see also HALE, supra note 39, at 238-39 
(concluding that interpreters tend to alter the pragmatic force of courtroom discourse, 
particularly questions); Grabau & Gibbons, supra note 75, at 311-17 (summarizing many 
of Berk-Seligson’s findings as interpreter bias strategies); Russell, supra note 132, at 152-
53 (finding patterns of tense shifts, register shifts, ungrammatical content, hedges, and 
other linguistic features that did not align with the message in its source language). 
141 Examples abound where the interpreters’ struggles to match both form and 
function had a significant effect.  In a rape prosecution of a Hmong man, for example, 
the interpreters failed to voice English equivalents to derogatory terms used by the vic-
tim, a Hmong woman, in her testimony.  See Timothy Dunnigan & Bruce T. Downing, 
Legal Interpreting on Trial:  A Case Study, in TRANSLATION AND THE LAW 93, 94-98 (Mar-
shall Morris ed., 1995) (discussing State v. Her, 510 N.W.2d 218, 222-23 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1994)).  There, the convicted defendant failed to convince the appeals court that 
the interpreters’ consistent choices to interpret the victim’s speech in accordance with 
the prosecution’s portrayal of her as a shy, naive, and innocent Asian woman gave him a 
right to a new trial with better interpreters, despite the appellate court’s agreement that 
the interpreters’ less complete and less graphic account hurt the defendant.  Id. at 104.   
142 Berk-Seligson documented a total of eighteen interpreters working a total of 
114 hours in initial appearances, preliminary hearings, arraignments, pleas, pre-trial 
motions, trials, and sentencings.  BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 42, at 43-44. 
143 See id. chs. 6-8; see also EDWARDS, supra note 99, ch. 5 (finding interpreters mi-
sunderstanding context, misunderstanding witness speech, rendering an incomplete 
message, erring in meaning, choosing imprecise register, condescending, interpreting 
literally, using idiomatic expressions, using false cognates, applying homilies, and er-
ring in regard to regional variations). 
144 See BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 42, at 22; HALE, supra note 39, at 35-36 (discuss-
ing the pragmatic control of question form).  Hale distinguishes between illocutionary 
point and illocutionary force, noting, for example, that requests and commands have 
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many of Berk-Seligson’s examples, the interpreters adjusted the ex-
amining attorney’s questions or modified the witness’s responses in 
ways that allowed the interpreter to wrest linguistic control away from 
the attorney.  Most of the interpreter additions were powerless in na-
ture, including hedges, uncontracted forms, politeness markers, par-
ticles, and hesitations.145  Interpreters also rendered witnesses’ answers 
to attorney questions hypercorrect and in a more formal register.146 
The interpretive process itself, especially when testimonial inter-
preting is done consecutively, can also provide opportunities for wit-
nesses to provide narrative answers, which may suggest to the jury, 
consciously or subconsciously, that the attorney has less control over 
adverse witnesses in ways that alter the jurors’ perceptions of both the 
witnesses and the attorneys.147  Interpreters may also shield the witness 
from word traps, fast-paced questions, and other attempts to rattle wit-
nesses.148  Hale’s study also found that interpreters systematically omit-
 
the same illocutionary point, but that commands have much stronger illocutionary 
force.  HALE, supra note 39, at 36.  Interpreters can adjust illocutionary force by, 
among other things, tempering commands or strengthening requests. 
145 See BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 42, at 131.  Regarding politeness markers, for 
example, Berk-Seligson found that interpreters with empathy for the non–English 
speaker often inserted nonpresent politeness forms to put the witness at ease, which 
often led the witness to reciprocate with a polite marker, directed toward the interpre-
ter, into the record.  Id. at 150.  O’Barr’s studies showed that politeness markers and 
other powerless features reduced a mock juror’s perception of the witness’s convin-
cingness, truthfulness, competence, intelligence, and trustworthiness.  See O’BARR, su-
pra note 32, at 74-75.  Interestingly, Berk-Seligson found that interpreter-inserted po-
liteness markers actually enhanced ratings for competence and intelligence.  See BERK-
SELIGSON, supra note 42, at 162.  Another similar study on hesitations and hedges in 
interpreted witness testimony found a marked decrease in guilty verdicts when the wit-
ness interpretation systematically used hesitations and hedges.  See Norma A. Mendoza, 
Harmon M. Hosch, Bruce J. Ponder & Victor Carillo, Well . . . Ah . . . :  Hesitations and 
Hedges as an Influence on Jurors’ Decisions, 30 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2610, 2610-20 
(2000).  Despite contrary findings, these studies share the conclusion that these types 
of modifications can affect juror perceptions. 
146 See BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 42, at 171-72.  Berk-Seligson’s findings again 
showed an opposite trend from O’Barr’s findings, here showing that the move from 
the consultative register to the formal register enhanced juror perceptions of compe-
tence, intelligence, and trustworthiness.  Id. at 172-75.  But Berk-Seligson’s other find-
ings supported O’Barr’s conclusions.  See, e.g., id. at 181-84. 
147 See id. at 119-22. 
148 See, e.g., MICHAEL COOKE, INDIGENOUS INTERPRETING ISSUES FOR COURTS 22 
(2002), available at http://www.aija.org.au/ac01/Cooke.pdf (providing an example of 
an interpreter shielding a witness from police pressure to contradict a statement made 
by the witness at an earlier date); Michael Cooke, Aboriginal Evidence in the Cross-
Cultural Courtroom (providing transcript examples of interpreters shielding witnesses 
from hostile cross-examination), in LANGUAGE IN EVIDENCE:  ISSUES CONFRONTING 
ABORIGINAL AND MULTICULTURAL AUSTRALIA 55, 73-76 (Diana Eades ed., 1995).  
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ted argumentative and coercive markers in interpreted questions, likely 
because they were seen as superfluous to the message or because they 
lacked effective equivalents.149  Many of the alterations were subtle but 
could easily combine to great effect.  For example, an interpreter inter-
preted an attorney’s question, which used the passive voice as a means 
to imply blame, in a way that prompted the witness to downplay or 
background his own involvement and place in the foreground another 
possible culpable party.150  Berk-Seligson found that overall, these ad-
justments significantly affected juror perceptions of witness and attor-
ney convincingness, competency, intelligence, and trustworthiness.151 
In each instance, the interpreter departed from her ethical role 
under the standards discussed above.152  But often, the court welcomes 
some interpreter modifications because they reduce the court’s fru-
stration with the interpretive process, lead to more efficient question-
ing, and help to culturally mediate between the court and the wit-
ness.153  In fact, one legal compendium recommends that an attorney 
questioning through an interpreter ask short questions, avoid the pas-
sive voice, avoid double negatives, clarify pronouns, and not inter-
rupt.154  These tendencies might be pragmatically valuable for more 
 
149 See HALE, supra note 39, at 85-86. 
150 See BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 42, at 99-105 (studying cultural approaches to 
using the passive voice to avoid blame). 
151 See id. at 171-72 (describing how hypercorrectness significantly affects perceived 
competency, intelligence, and trustworthiness); id. at 181 (describing how hedges sig-
nificantly affect perceived convincingness, competency, intelligence, and trustworthi-
ness); id. at 184 (describing how added passive voice significantly affects perceived intel-
ligence and trustworthiness); id. at 187-88 (describing how interpreter interruption of an 
attorney significantly affects perceived attorney competence); id. at 189-90 (describing 
how interpreter interruption of a witness significantly affects perceived intelligence). 
152 See supra text accompanying notes 130-131. 
153 See, e.g., BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 42, at 65-71, 85 (providing examples of pos-
itive interpreter intrusion to clarify a confused line of testimony).  However, Berk-
Seligson also found several examples of interpreter behavior that did seem to help the 
court run smoother and more efficiently, but perhaps at too high a cost.  See id. at 65-
86 (finding occurrences of interpreters challenging attorneys’ questioning tactics, in-
itiating discussions or questions with other parties in the courtroom on the record, and 
initiating side conversations with witnesses).  One argument in favor of greater use of 
CDIs is that doing so will enhance the ability of the interpretation to address the “many 
subtle or not-so-subtle differences found between American mainstream culture and the 
deaf culture.”  LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 926 (quoting Phyllis Wilcox, Dual In-
terpretation and Discourse Effectiveness in Legal Settings, 7 J. INTERPRETATION 89, 94 (1995)). 
154 CONNELL & VALLADARES, supra note 74, § 2.5(c).  But this may not be a limita-
tion about which courts should concern themselves.  Although a defending attorney is 
necessarily limited in the types of questions she can ask when a witness’s significant 
communication limitations only permit answers of “yes” or “no,” one court found this 
similar to “cross examining a child [or] a blind person” and ruled that it was not a li-
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efficient court administration, but they illustrate a lack of confidence 
in a legally equivalent transfer. 
With so much meaning and control buried in the form of the at-
torney’s question and the witness’s response, one must wonder how 
much of that form can be retained when working through not one, but 
two interpreters (a hearing ASL interpreter and a CDI), and not two 
languages, but one language and a more spontaneous system of gestur-
al or mimed communication.  For example, a CDI cannot retain the 
passive language structure when moving in and out of a nonlanguage.  
Nor can the CDI retain a well-placed double negative or preserve an at-
torney’s trap placed in a longer or complicated question.  Yet, the in-
terpreters’ work product will have a form, chosen and applied by the 
interpreters, that jurors use as a factor in evaluating witness credibility. 
Interpreter inaccuracies are not confined to aspects of facts and 
form.  The resulting interpreted language can easily lack the function, 
or legal substance, so forcefully contained in the source language.  
Frozen texts, such as the Miranda warning or the interaction required 
for a guilty plea, provide ample opportunity for linguists to study how 
much intended meaning is actually transferred to the non–English 
speaker.  Rob Hoopes focused on the Miranda warning and found 
that, even with advanced interpreters operating under no time con-
straints, almost a third of the studied interpretations failed to convey 
an understanding of the deaf person’s legal rights.155  With time con-
straints, Hoopes noted that interpreters falling behind chose to delete 
information because they felt they lacked standing to repeatedly inter-
rupt the judge or questioning attorney.156 
One reason why the rendered target language might be deficient 
is because the deaf audience may not be able to independently fill in 
the resulting gaps.  For example, many deaf adults lack a basic under-
standing of the legal implications of Miranda.  Because most deaf indi-
viduals have lower reading abilities (often between third- and fifth-
grade reading levels) and less access to a lifetime of aural input (from 
overheard conversations, television and movies, and the like), deaf in-
dividuals are less informed about how the legal system works and what 
their constitutional rights are.157  MLS deaf adults are much less likely 
than even the average deaf adult to know how the legal system works. 
 
mitation placed upon the parties by the court.  People v. Tran, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 905, 
912 (Ct. App. 1996). 
155 Hoopes, supra note 120, at 42-45. 
156 Id. at 33-34.   
157 See id. at 45. 
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This reality highlights that interpreters are not simple conduits for 
courtroom discourse.  Even when interpreters are working in consecu-
tive mode, they have both the ability and the tendency to alter the 
source language.  Thus, the non-English-speaking participant sees a 
slightly skewed rendition of the proceedings as the interpreter makes 
slight language adjustments moving into the target language.  The 
English-speaking participants in the courtroom also hear a slightly 
skewed version.  Only the interpreter or another fluently bilingual 
speaker has full access to what really happens within the interpreted 
discourse. Even if the interpreter is aware of these errors, however, 
problems abound in correcting them. 
b.  Interpreter Ability to Repair Errors 
An obvious prerequisite to repairing interpreter errors is for the 
court or the interpreters to identify them.  Unless it is a bilingual 
courtroom, other officers of the court are usually not proficient in 
other languages to the degree that would enable them to directly 
monitor the interpreters’ effectiveness.  Relying on other courtroom 
participants to monitor the interpreters, even if they are bilingual at-
torneys or judges, can be problematic because they may lack the ne-
cessary training and should likely be devoting their attention to mat-
ters other than the interpretation.158  Some courts try to mitigate the 
influence of a juror who is proficient in the interpreted language by 
asking the bilingual juror to swear to accept the court interpreter’s 
version over any version they hear from the non–English source, whe-
reas other courts may ask bilingual jurors to notify the judge if they 
identify an interpretation error.159 
However, one way the court does monitor interpreter accuracy is 
through ongoing analysis of whether the interpreted reply matches 
the question asked.  If the witness’s answers are too far afield from 
what was asked, the judge may feel there is an interpreter error.  This 
is a weak form of monitoring for two reasons.  First, the witness may 
actually be responding off target or nonsensically.  Second, the inter-
preter may be wary of drawing attention to herself, and she may adjust 
her interpretation to smooth over the troublesome response.160 
 
158 See LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 919-20 (criticizing the requirement of con-
temporaneous objections because they place additional burdens on deaf defendants). 
159 See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 99, at 70 (describing a juror’s correction of the 
interpreter’s mistaken translation of the word “gun” as “purse”).   
160 See BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 42, at 65 (highlighting the interpreter’s unease 
at translating a witness’s meaningless answer when it could cause the court to question 
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Instead, the most common solutions to protect the accuracy and 
integrity of the interpretation are to use team interpreters161 and a 
separate interpreter who can monitor the proceedings interpreter and 
the witness interpreter162 (which aligns with the physical arrangement 
of most trials involving deaf defendants).163  A table interpreter who 
also monitors the proceedings and witness interpreters from her seat 
next to the attorney can inform the attorney of misrepresentations, 
and the attorney can then object.164 
One unacceptable solution is to rely on the interpreter to recog-
nize errors and self-correct.165  Another unacceptable solution is to ex-
pect the non–English speaker to identify when the interpretation is 
inaccurate.166  This solution ignores the reality of a multilingual envi-
ronment.  A person who is not proficient in the source language 
would not know if the interpreter added, omitted, or modified con-
tent from the source language.167  Instead, in the American adversarial 
tradition, courts rely on the parties to monitor the interpretation.168 
 
the interpreter’s abilities); see also People v. Vasquez, No. B162629, 2004 WL 348785, at 
*4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2004).   
161 See generally Team Interpreting in the Courtroom, POSITION PAPER (Nat’l Ass’n of 
Judiciary Interpreters & Translators, Seattle, Wash.), Mar. 1, 2007, available at http:// 
www.najit.org/documents/Team_Interpreting.pdf (advocating for team interpretation 
as a means of reducing interpreter fatigue and increasing accuracy). 
162 See MATHERS, supra note 31, at 142-43.  The monitor interpreters can monitor 
more than just linguistic errors; they can also monitor ethical and protocol errors.  See 
id.  But see id. at 165 (arguing that corrections effected by a monitor interpreter high-
light, but may not alleviate, the inadequacy of the interpretation).   
163 See MATHERS, supra note 31, at 127 fig.12 (illustrating an effective configuration). 
164 See LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 921-23. 
165 Certainly, professional and conscientious interpreters will self-correct when 
they are aware of an error and have the ability to self-correct; but generally, it is diffi-
cult for a working interpreter to always know if the target language lacks some aspect 
of the source language.  A further concern is that an interpreter may lack the courage 
to interrupt the court to self-correct when it reflects poorly on the interpreter or calls 
that interpreter’s competence into question.  Ambrose Bierce defined an interpreter, 
in his typical caustic manner, as “[o]ne who enables two persons of different languages 
to understand each other by repeating to each what it would have been to the inter-
preter’s advantage for the other to have said.”  AMBROSE BIERCE, THE UNABRIDGED 
DEVIL’S DICTIONARY 135 (David E Schultz & S.T. Joshi eds., 2000). 
166 See LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 919-20 (arguing that such a task is near-
ly impossible for a deaf person). 
167 Id. at 919-21. 
168 One circuit court found the adversarial environment sufficient to guard against 
inaccuracies in interpretation for a deaf juror:  “Any problems with inadequate inter-
pretation, because the interpreter either interjects opinions or incompetently inter-
prets can be monitored by the parties to the suit because the proceeding is in open 
court.”  United States v. Dempsey, 830 F.2d 1084, 1088 (10th Cir. 1987).  An attorney’s 
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However, handling perceived and uncorrected inaccuracies in the 
ongoing interpretation is its own mire.169  On one hand, the attorney 
noticing an error must timely object or risk waiving any challenge to 
the interpretation.170  On the other hand, though, most litigators and 
interpreters know “the privilege to interrupt the Court and report an 
error must not be abused—because it is truly a limited privilege.”171 
Generally, only substantial errors earn objections.  Other interpre-
tive errors, usually of the kind earlier described as modifications to 
form, are chalked up to the inevitable imperfection of the task of in-
terpreting; unless tangible prejudice can be shown, many courts will 
not attend to these errors in any depth.172  One must also consider the 
effect of correcting the error or objecting.  Berk-Seligson found that 
an interpreter’s interruptions of an attorney led jurors to rate the at-
torney as significantly less competent, and an interpreter’s interrup-
tions of a witness led jurors to rate the witness as significantly more in-
telligent.173  Even though the evidentiary discussions of the objection 
occur outside the ears of the jury, the sidebar necessarily interrupts 
the flow of the trial and can seriously hamper the questioning attor-
ney’s direct- or cross-examination. 
When confronting an alleged misinterpretation, the judge can of-
ten simply direct the interpreter to seek clarification from the wit-
 
failure to monitor the adequacy of the interpretation could be grounds for a claim of 
ineffective counsel.  See MATHERS, supra note 31, at 204.   
169 See Grabau & Gibbons, supra note 75, at 286 (discussing protocol for the work-
ing interpreter to correct the record). 
170 See FED. R. EVID. 103 (requiring “timely objection”); see also United States v. Vil-
legas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1348 (2d Cir. 1990) (denying the defendant’s claim of an incom-
petent interpreter in part because allowing “a defendant to remain silent throughout 
the trial and then, upon being found guilty, to assert a claim of inadequate translation 
would be an open invitation to abuse”); United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 471 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (finding “no objection at the time of trial” and “no direct evidence . . . to 
indicate that there was any particular portion of the original trial that the defendants 
could not actually understand”).  
171 MATHERS, supra note 31, at 150.  Indeed, “in an ideal world, the American legal 
system would choose to have the court interpreter physically invisible and vocally si-
lent, if that were at all possible.”  BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 42, at 54.  Mathers 
presents a coherent process for determining whether and how to object effectively.  See 
MATHERS, supra note 31, at 149-63; see also Grabau & Gibbons, supra note 75, at 291-93. 
172 See MATHERS, supra note 31, at 150-52 (discussing two cases, State v. Mitjans, 
408 N.W.2d 824, 832 (Minn. 1987), and State v. Her, 510 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. 
1994), that affirmed convictions because errors in translation were determined to be 
nonprejudicial). 
173 See supra text accompanying notes 140-157; BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 42, at 
187-90. 
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ness.174  When this option is not available post-trial, the court must 
look back to the original testimony to consider revisions, but many 
courts fail to preserve the original verbal or visual testimony.175  Some 
courts use audio or videotaping as a means to help the judge resolve 
disputed interpretations.176  During the sidebar, then, the feuding in-
terpreters still have access to an audio or video version of the original 
source language, which can help them either agree on a correct in-
terpretation or give them information they need to present their cases 
to the judge.177 
3.  Ensuring CDI and ASL Interpreter Accuracy 
The previous two subsections discussed problems that courts face 
in achieving accuracy when having an interpreter work with a non-
English-speaking witness in the courtroom.  However, the unique situ-
 
174 See Grabau & Gibbons, supra note 75, at 291-93. 
175 See CONNELL & VALLADARES, supra note 74, § 2.5(a) n.109 (citing cases holding that 
there is no requirement of maintaining a foreign language or sign language transcript). 
176 This preservation of the source language is also important in appealing an in-
terpreter-related issue.  See Davis & Hewitt, supra note 96, at 136-37 (asserting that the 
quality of court interpretation cannot be evaluated on appeal without a video or audio 
record); Grabau & Gibbons, supra note 75, at 294-96 (recommending video as the pre-
ferred method for preserving the record); LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 924 
(“Courts are beginning to recognize that it is impossible to know whether the interpre-
tation meets the requirements of the law without a record of the interpretation it-
self.”).  The National Consortium of Interpreter Education Centers suggests as a best 
practice that courts videotape all ASL statements in every stage of a proceeding be-
cause, despite all precautions to ensure interpreter accuracy, the risk of error persists.  
STEWART ET AL., supra note 100, at 22. 
 The presence of a video camera itself could affect the trial and witness testimony.  
Most studies support the idea that camera presence in the courtroom does not impede 
the smooth function of the judiciary or impose prejudice or a psychological impact on 
participants, but one study of Nevada proceedings did find witnesses more opposed to 
camera usage than attorneys or judges.  RONALD L. GOLDFARB, TV OR NOT TV:  TELE-
VISION, JUSTICE, AND THE COURTS 71-72 (1998).  Another study, using mock witnesses 
and jurors, found that “perceived witness nervousness was not found to adversely affect 
juror perceptions of the quality of witness testimony . . . . [Video-taped] witness testi-
mony was seen as being as clear as [other] witness testimony.”  MARJORIE COHN & DA-
VID DOW, CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM:  TELEVISION AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 64 
(1998) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also WILLIAM E. 
HEWITT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, VIDEOTAPED TRIAL RECORDS:  EVALUATION 
AND GUIDE 81-83 (1990) (presenting study results showing that video recording is not 
likely to negatively affect courtroom decorum, alter courtroom procedures substantial-
ly, or influence behavior of courtroom participants). 
177 See MATHERS, supra note 31, at 163 (quoting one judge’s rationale for record-
ing testimony); LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 923 (“Videotaping the proceedings 
provides an opportunity for the interpreter and the parties to continually assess the 
interpreting process.”). 
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ation of having an MLS witness testify through a CDI-ASL interpreting 
team poses additional challenges that these best practices fail to over-
come.  The complexity of the linguistic interaction may, at times, pre-
vent the court from safely relying on best practices, such as ensuring 
competency and monitoring interpreters. 
Courts rely on parties in the adversarial system to act as the refin-
er’s fire, to challenge errors of consequence as the proceedings 
progress.  The requirement for parties to object timely to interpreta-
tion errors may be incompatible with the linguistic reality of an in-the-
courtroom interpretation of an MLS witness’s testimony.  The inter-
preters’ abilities to identify and correct MLS interpreting errors are 
even more limited.  The CDI uses highly specialized skills, and her in-
teraction with the MLS deaf adult, which includes the formation of an 
impromptu communication system, is linguistically complex.  The 
contemporaneous-objection requirement fails to protect against er-
rors that are not readily apparent but that could be substantial in na-
ture.  Even if the court videotapes the source language and makes it 
available at a sidebar, parties may not have the time or the expertise to 
study the interaction and discern the correct interpretation. 
If the MLS deaf adult is a crucial witness for one of the parties, the 
court should allow the parties to exercise greater care in handling that 
witness’s testimony.  Under current best practices, one of the parties 
could bring in a monitor CDI and perhaps a sign language linguist to 
observe the testimony and its interpretation.  This, however, could be 
an insufficient protection. 
Suppose, for example, that the MLS witness has information 
about the weapon used in the commission of a crime.  The interpre-
ters know the weapon alleged to have been used because they have 
been present throughout the entire trial.  The MLS witness, however, 
may not know what evidence and exhibits the prosecutor has or what 
the other witnesses have said.  The questioning attorney asks the MLS 
witness if he saw the defendant with a weapon in his hand. 
Here, the interpreters must be careful not to inadvertently feed to 
the MLS witness information the witness could unknowingly adopt 
and then represent as a detail in his testimony.178  In a typical single-
 
178 These types of influences may not only be inadvertent, but they may also be 
required.  The rules of language allow the interpreter to choose among many avenues 
to present information, but the interpreter must choose one, and the one she chooses 
may have linguistic information embedded within it at a grammatical or syntactic level.  
Gile calls this “linguistically induced information,” and he found that interpreters of-
ten interpreted both the message and the linguistically induced information because 
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interpreter scenario, the monitor interpreter could more easily look 
to the witness interpreter to see if the interpreter led the witness by 
choosing a specific type of weapon or by artificially limiting the sign 
choices for weapon.179  Indeed, the problem of inadvertent or uncons-
cious leading or suggesting is one reason courts require a separation 
of some interpreter functions.180  It would be much easier for a moni-
tor interpreter to identify inappropriate leading.  With an MLS wit-
ness, however, the CDI has much more latitude in developing a com-
municative system with the witness.  As a result, the CDI may use 
leading information, and the witness could take that information and 
use it in a way that, for example, backgrounds his own involvement or 
an incriminating detail, or that foregrounds another’s involvement or 
a more innocuous detail.  The effects of this leading information, or 
even its mere existence, would be difficult for anyone not fluent with 
sign language linguistics to immediately observe.181 
In our example, the CDI provides a gestured list of possible wea-
pons—a gun, a knife, a club, and a fist—knowing that a point of con-
flict in other witnesses’ testimonies is the description of the weapon 
used.  Some previous witnesses testified about a longer cane, stick, or 
rake handle, whereas others recalled a short, stubby baseball bat.  The 
MLS witness adopts the CDI’s gesture for a club, retaining its shorter 
stature.  It becomes a question whether the MLS witness intended to 
adopt merely the concept of a long and cylindrical object or the more 
detail-oriented short and stubby baseball bat.  Ideally, the CDI interpre-
ter would retain this ambiguity in the signed response that goes back to 
the attorney and onto the record.  The concern here, however, is 
whether the court has an adequate check on these types of interactions. 
 
they could not distinguish between the two and they did not want to leave any part of 
the message out.  GILE, supra note 18, at 57, 61-62.  As an example, Gile describes the 
fact that Japanese does not always distinguish between singular and plural, distinguish 
among various verb tenses, or identify which nouns are the verb’s subject and object.  
Id. at 67-68.  An interpreter presenting this information in English cannot create an 
utterance that retains these ambiguities, and so, from behind the interpreter’s veil, the 
interpreter must choose the number, tense, and subject/object. 
179 ASL lacks a single signed expression for weapon; instead, ASL uses an open-
ended list, such as GUN, KNIFE, CLUB, VARIOUS. 
180 See MATHERS, supra note 31, at 105-08 (identifying conflicts when an interpreter 
serving the function of interpreting for the party later serves another function of in-
terpreting for the record, thereby raising the danger that the interpreter may “incor-
porate[] background knowledge from prior interpreting to construct meaning”). 
181 This is precisely why “all interaction between the deaf witness and the interpre-
ters must be mediated through the court.”  MATHERS, supra note 25, at 92. 
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In order to preserve the benefits of the adversarial system and pro-
tect the integrity of the interpretation, courts need an avenue to allow 
parties to take additional measures.  The next Part looks to how courts 
handle document translations as a model for a possible solution. 
III.  INTERPRETATION AS TRANSLATION:  AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD  
FOR PRESENTING MLS WITNESS TESTIMONY 
Courts can enhance the integrity of an MLS witness’s interpreta-
tion by mirroring some procedural steps used to admit translated evi-
dence.  Many lay readers confuse interpretation, which involves a live 
reproduction of a spoken or signed language, with translation, which 
involves a reproduction of language in one written form to another 
written form.182  Some of the weaknesses in interpreting correspond to 
some of the strengths in translating:  translations occur outside the 
hurried courtroom, and translators can use outside resources, such as 
supplementary texts and peer reviews, to aid in their translations.  
Fact-finders arbitrating between competing translations are thus more 
informed about the linguistic dispute.  The model this Comment pro-
poses allows MLS witness testimony to occur in a deposition-like envi-
ronment at trial, outside the presence of the jury but on videotape, with 
that videotape and a corrected voice-over interpretation being shown to 
the jury after parties have an opportunity to review and refine it. 
This proposal is not an expression of nonconfidence in the work 
of a CDI-ASL interpreter team.  These professionals are essential to 
tapping an MLS witness’s reservoir of knowledge and experience that 
justice seeks to have exposed at trial.  Nor is this proposal an en-
croachment on their work in the courtroom.  Rather, it introduces a 
feedback loop between the time the interpreters interpret for the 
MLS witness and the time that information is conveyed to the jury.  
Within this feedback loop, the interpreters, parties, and other experts 
can refine the interpretation in a way that enhances its integrity.  In 
this way, the court can protect the proceedings from errors in fact, 
form, and function. 
A.  Introducing Translations into Evidence 
The court’s handling of non–English witness testimony through 
interpreters is quite different from the court’s handling of non–
English written documents introduced into evidence.  Interpreting in-
 
182 MIKKELSON, supra note 132, at 67. 
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volves “the transfer of an oral message from one language to another 
in real time,” whereas translating involves “the transfer of a written 
message from one language to another,” which may occur at any 
time.183  An interpreter is in the courtroom speaking as her words en-
ter the record.  Occasionally, an interpreter may also do a sight trans-
lation, or an on-the-spot reading and translation of a document in real 
time, for entry into the record.184 
Translators, however, see their work enter into evidence quite dif-
ferently.  Some procedural differences afford written translations 
greater protections than those readily available for real-time interpre-
tations.  Though the Federal Rules of Evidence do not directly address 
the introduction of foreign language documents into evidence, some 
states have addressed this issue in an addition to their rules of evi-
dence under Rule 1009.  Arkansas and Texas, for example, only admit 
translated documents and recordings into evidence when the party 
seeking admission includes an affidavit from a qualified translator cer-
tifying its accuracy and then provides both the original text and its 
translation to all parties.185  Other parties can then review the transla-
tion, object to portions, and submit evidence supporting their own 
proposed translations.186  If another party submits an alternative trans-
lation, the court must determine whether there is a genuine issue re-
garding the accuracy of the translation, and if there is such an issue, 
the court can allow both parties to submit their proposed translations 
to the jury for its determination.187 
These rules do not affect a party’s right to enter evidence by live 
testimony, which presumably includes the court’s working interpreter 
during witness testimony.188  Faced with evidence in a foreign lan-
guage, a party in Arkansas can seek to introduce either a scrutinized 
translation or a live-action sight translation by the proceedings inter-
 
183 Id. (emphasis added).  Mikkelson does differentiate between “translating” and 
“translation,” the former requiring a written source text, whereas the latter refers to 
the general act of transferring between languages, whether it be through interpreting 
or translating.  Id. 
184 See id. at 76-77. 
185 ARK. R. EVID. 1009; TEX. R. EVID. 1009; see also EDWARDS, supra note 99, chs. 6-7; 
Shuy, supra note 63, at 6. 
186 See, e.g., ARK. R. EVID. 1009(b).  Different procedures, with different conse-
quences and problems, may accompany written translations of earlier verbal events, 
such as transcriptions of covertly recorded telephone conversations.  See Mary Bu-
choltz, Language in Evidence:  The Pragmatics of Translation and the Judicial Process, in VIII 
TRANSLATION AND THE LAW, supra note 141, at 115, 116-17. 
187 ARK. R. EVID. 1009(d). 
188 Id. R. 1009(e). 
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preter.189  Translators working outside the courtroom have access to 
many more resources than are available in the courtroom, and they 
produce more accurate translations.190  One study found significant 
disparity between courtroom interpretations and out-of-court written 
translations of the same source language.191 
In these Rule 1009 situations, the court relies on the adversarial 
system to ensure accuracy and integrity in the language conversion.  If 
the parties provide competing translations, the judge can allow it to 
become a question of fact for the fact-finder to decide, or the judge 
can use a special proceeding to decide which version to accept.  With-
in either avenue, each side can present its proposed translation with 
its supporting experts to persuade the fact-finder why its particular 
translation is more accurate.192 
In contrast, in a sidebar between the judge and the parties discuss-
ing a challenged interpretation, the court has only the few attending 
interpreters and little or no access to a static version of the source lan-
guage to use as resources.  The judge, “despite [her] lack of expertise 
in the languages used, translation principles, and linguistics,” must 
make a finding of fact that is particularly difficult to remedy once 
made.193  The court also runs the risk that the interpreter will make 
nearly irrebuttable assertions of fact in her interpretation, supported 
by the court’s validation of her qualifications, which itself was based, 
not on her ongoing performance but on the court’s initial assessment 
of her qualifications following voir dire.194 
 
189 Id. 
190 See EDWARDS, supra note 99, ch. 3.  Most courts disallow many of these mate-
rials, and the timing of the live interpreting prevents ready access to them.  This is also 
a glaring difference between regular translation done outside the courtroom and sight 
translation, which is an oral translation of a document in court done without prior 
preparation.  Cf. MIKKELSON, supra note 132, at 76-77. 
191 See, e.g., HALE, supra note 39, ch. 5 (discussing semantic and syntactic differ-
ences between authentic courtroom interpretations and later-composed written trans-
lations). 
192 See Shuy, supra note 63, at 6-7 (“Sometimes [judges] throw up their hands and 
let both sides present their own transcripts to the jury.”). 
193 Id.  
194 The defendants made a similar argument in State v. Van Pham, 675 P.2d 848 
(Kan. 1984).  There, the defendants tried to reserve their right to challenge the choice 
of interpreter later in the proceeding after they had a better opportunity to measure 
the interpreter’s effectiveness and accuracy, but the “trial court was not satisfied with 
this response and indicated if the two defendants had any objection to the court’s in-
terpreter they were to voice them then.  The competency of an interpreter should be 
determined prior to the time he or she discharges his or her duties.”  Id. at 856.  Nor 
were the defendants permitted to challenge the competency of the interpreter in the 
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Written translations presented to the court sidestep many of these 
potential pitfalls.195  First, because both parties must share evidence 
prior to trial—including the original and translated texts—both sides 
know in advance the facts, form, and function of the language pro-
posed for introduction into evidence.  Second, the parties do not rely 
on a court-appointed interpreter’s performance on the particular day 
the evidence is introduced.  Instead, the parties can employ their own 
chosen translators.  Last, the parties have access to significant resources 
prior to the evidence’s introduction.  If the court must hold an eviden-
tiary hearing to resolve differences among parties regarding a translated 
document, the parties can present expert witnesses to assist the court.196 
B.  Applying the Translation Evidentiary Model to CDI-Interpreted Testimony 
Most every interpretation, if permitted the luxury of time and at-
tention, would come out better than the time-constrained courtroom 
version created with few resources.197  Indeed, current shifts between 
simultaneous interpreting for overall proceedings and consecutive in-
terpreting for witness testimony evolved in part because consecutive 
interpretation is generally felt to provide enhanced linguistic access 
with only modest losses to the court’s time and efficiency.198  Most 
courts agree that when a witness testifies in a foreign language, con-
 
jury’s presence, despite defendants’ allegations of numerous errors during the trial.  
Id. at 861-62. 
195 This argument should not be construed to imply that the work of translating is 
in any way beneath the work of interpreting.  As Marshall Morris notes, “legal transla-
tion is not a matter of ‘mere formulae,’ not something that can be done in automatic 
fashion.”  Marshall Morris, Editor’s Preface to VIII TRANSLATION AND THE LAW, supra 
note 141, at 7.  Just as an interpreter faces the challenge of discerning among the “in-
finite nuancing of texts and meanings,” so too does the translator.  Id. at 1. 
196 The standards for admitting expert testimony are described in Federal Rules of 
Evidence 702 and 703.  
197 For numerous examples of improved form and function in translated questions 
over their authentic courtroom counterparts, see HALE, supra note 39, at 213-29. 
198 Consecutive interpreting is the model for nearly all witness testimony, but even 
it has limits.  During the Nuremberg trial, which was a showcase of simultaneous inter-
preting and the marvels of multilingual technologies that eventually served as the 
model for United Nations proceedings, simultaneous interpreting was used for all 
phases of the trial.  E. Peter Uiberall, Foreword to GAIBA, supra note 1, at 11.  One esti-
mate suggested that the trial, conducted simultaneously in four languages, would have 
taken four years instead of one year had the court imposed a consecutive interpreting 
requirement.  Id.  Simultaneous interpreting at Nuremberg, however, did occasionally 
cause problems.  See, e.g., GAIBA, supra note 1, at 108-11 (describing Göring’s exploita-
tion of his knowledge of English and German to attempt to show that the interpreters 
were biased and that the trial was an orchestrated sham). 
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secutive interpreting is necessary to ensure accuracy, even when it 
slows the trial.199  In similar fashion, a court facing the introduction of 
MLS testimony should, upon a party’s showing of need, temporarily 
slow the trial to best ensure the integrity of that testimony.  Using a 
CDI is one mechanism that slows the trial, but the parties also need a 
corresponding period to study the MLS witness’s responses before 
waiving their right to challenge the interpretation. 
In one proposal, Grabau and Gibbons suggest that the judge, 
when faced with a dispute about the accuracy of an interpretation, 
should appoint another interpreter as an expert witness to help the 
court resolve the matter.200  This approach has two weaknesses.  First, 
the court faces the same issues of competency and accuracy with the 
second interpreter as it does with the first.  Second, this approach only 
works if the court has adequate safeguards to ensure the source lan-
guage reviewed by the second interpreter is identical to that encoun-
tered by the first interpreter.  This is often only available through au-
dio or video recordings, unless the dispute is one that can be resolved 
by repetition of the witness’s statement.  This method is particularly 
ineffective when dealing with an MLS deaf witness because a second 
CDI would be required to either witness the entire source testimony 
or execute her own interaction with the witness in order to come to 
an understanding. 
This Comment suggests an alternate procedure for handling MLS 
testimony that allows for greater linguistic care and scrutiny.  This 
proposal serves as an alternative to—not a blanket replacement for—
the current CDI-ASL team interpreting during MLS witness testimony.  
This model may be helpful in situations where the MLS witness’s tes-
timony is particularly contentious, crucial, or uncertain. 
If the court finds such a hearing necessary, the interpreter and 
CDI would continue to act as witness interpreters.  The attorneys 
would conduct direct and cross-examinations outside of the presence 
of the jury but in the presence of video cameras.  Following witness 
testimony, each side may subject the videotaped testimony, with its 
proposed interpretation, to its own linguistic analysis to identify 
whether the interpreters accurately convey the MLS witness testimo-
ny.201  Here, parties would have a better opportunity to identify errors 
 
199 MIKKELSON, supra note 132, at 70. 
200 Grabau & Gibbons, supra note 75, at 290-91.   
201 The videotape would preserve the ASL interpreter’s signed interpretation of 
the original question, the CDI’s interaction with the MLS witness, the MLS witness’s 
responses to the CDI, the CDI’s signed response to the ASL interpreter, and the ASL 
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in fact, form, or function that, had the witness been an English speak-
er, would have been apparent in open court.  Their analysis would oc-
cur in an environment with more resources and more time to identify 
and challenge substantive errors.  Unlike the contemporaneous-
objection requirement in open court, here, the parties could identify 
errors, challenge them, and provide suggested corrections en masse. 
This analysis could reveal, for example, instances where the inter-
preters introduced or omitted a substantive fact or significantly al-
tered the form or function of a question or response.  If the interpre-
ters deviated from the attorney’s question or if identified errors lead 
to a need for additional witness questioning or clarification, the court 
can put the MLS witness back on the stand.  If the parties contest the 
proper interpretation for a particular portion of the MLS witness’s tes-
timony, the parties can introduce expert testimony from sign lan-
guage linguists or other specialists with insight into the language dy-
namics of MLS deaf adults.202  With this additional information, the 
court could choose which interpretation to present to the jury and 
have the interpreters voice over the erroneous part on the videotape 
before showing it to the jury.  The court could also allow both parties 
to present their versions and experts to the jury, leaving it as an open 
question of fact for the jury to decide. 
In the end, the jury would view the videotape of the MLS witness’s 
testimony.  That videotape would contain the interpreter’s vocal in-
terpretations, with perhaps some voice-overs to correct errors.  Here, 
the jury would retain its ability to see the witness’s body language, fa-
cial expressions, and other visual features customarily thought to be a 
part of the jury’s task in discerning which competing narrative to ac-
cept.203  The court could frame the showing of the videotape with in-
 
interpreter’s spoken response.  A more limited approach, which could narrow the fo-
cus of this evidentiary hearing, is to allow scrutiny of only the CDI and MLS witness 
interaction, thus leaving the ASL interpreter’s work subject to challenge in typical fa-
shion during the trial. 
202 In an ideal sense, a linguist would “analyze the language data and reach con-
clusions about it that would be the same no matter which side uses it.  Trial testimony 
is simply reporting the results of such analysis.”  Shuy, supra note 63, at 17. 
203 Courts have often stressed the need for jurors to see the testifying witness and 
for defendants to have an opportunity to confront their accusers face-to-face.  See, e.g., 
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019-22 (1988) (disallowing a screen to obscure testifying 
sexual assault victims from the defendant without individualized findings that the par-
ticular witnesses needed “special protection”); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. 
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 106 (6th ed. 2008) (describing demeanor 
problems with hearsay because the declarant “is not under the gaze of the trier of fact, 
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structions similar to those instructions that accompany the court’s ex-
planation of why a CDI intermediary is necessary to overcome the deaf 
witness’s semilingualism or nonlingualism.204 
 A recent California appeal shows a situation where such a hearing 
may have been appropriate.  In People v. Vasquez, a jury convicted the 
defendant of shooting Frank Hernandez in Hernandez’s mother’s liv-
ing room.205  The mother, Carmen Zapata, was in the living room 
when the shots were fired, and she proved to be a key witness in iden-
 
at least at the time he speaks, so the trier lacks those impressions and clues which 
voice, inflection, expression, and appearance convey”). 
204 See, e.g., People v. Vasquez, No. B162629, 2004 WL 348785, at *2-3 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Feb. 25, 2004).  In Vasquez, the trial court included this explanation to the jury to 
help them understand various accommodations made for an MLS witness’s testimony: 
 This particular witness, Ms. Zapata, does not speak and does not hear.  She 
uses a form of sign language and gesture to communicate.  That sign language 
and gesture is different from and set apart from American Sign Language or 
any other national sign language.  It incorporates certain parts of common 
sign language and incorporates what she has learned through her childhood 
and adult experience by way of an ability to communicate and express herself. 
. . . . 
 For that reason, the court has seen fit to utilize the services of two different 
interpreters for each occasion when Ms. Zapata is either questioned or gives 
an answer.  The interpreter standing directly in front of you now in the green, 
Ms. Gonzales, is known as an intermediary interpreter.  Her skills are devel-
oped because she also does not speak and is hearing impaired.  Accordingly, 
the intermediary interpreter has some similar experiences as would a witness 
that does not speak and does not hear.  The . . . intermediary . . . will then util-
ize the services of the American Sign Language interpreter.  Before you right 
now in the black is Ms. Cobb. 
 So when a question is posed from counsel, it first goes to the American Sign 
Language interpreter.  Right now that would be Ms. Cobb.  She will then 
translate it in sign language for Ms. Gonzales.  Ms. Gonzales will then use a 
form or a mixture of both known sign language expression, gesture, and facial 
expression and body language to communicate the essence of the question to 
the witness. 
 The witness in turn will respond to Ms. Gonzales and then to the American 
Sign Language interpreter, Ms. Cobb, and then Ms. Cobb will announce the 
testimony to the court. 
. . . . 
 I also gather that in the form of sign that the witness understands, there 
aren’t signs to cover certain concepts and that’s some of the struggle we’ve 
been having to communicate; because like any and every American, we all 
have equal access to the courts and if it means that we have to make special 
accommodations, we make special accommodations. 
Id. at *2-3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
205 Id. at *1. 
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tifying the defendant as the shooter.206  Zapata was deaf, and the lower 
court found her to be a semilingual MLS deaf adult and provided her 
with a CDI-ASL interpreter team when she testified.207 
During the trial, the defendant’s counsel repeatedly objected be-
cause “he could not tell if Zapata was ‘understanding what’s being in-
terpreted to her because we have no independent way of discerning 
what her state of mind is when the question is posed to her.’”208  In his 
appeal, Vasquez referred to a series of problematic exchanges.  On di-
rect, Zapata had testified she was asleep when the shots occurred, but 
when the defense asked her if she remembered telling the court she 
was asleep during the first shot, Zapata responded “No” and as the tri-
al court described, had “an expression on her face [that] was one of 
startled surprise. . . .  She had that kind of look on her face, like ‘What 
are you talking about?  I wasn’t asleep.’”209  The defense tried to clari-
fy, but Zapata responded “Who was standing?”210 
Vasquez objected during the trial, asserting that “this non sequitur 
proved either that Zapata did not understand the questions or that 
the interpreters were not interpreting correctly,” and his appeal al-
leged his inability to confront the witnesses testifying against him.211  
The trial court permitted Vasquez to argue that Zapata was less credi-
ble in her memory recall, but it prohibited him from arguing that the 
interpreters erred in their interpretation.212  The trial court noted in 
its opinion that the disputed exchange was the result of the interpre-
ters erring in pronouns, and that Zapata had actually meant that her 
son’s girlfriend was asleep.213 
The appeals court denied Vasquez’s claim that he was unable to 
confront Zapata in violation of his Sixth Amendment right,214 but it 
did so with only a narrow view of the interpretation limitations that 
arose during the trial.  The court seemed to look beyond the identi-
 
206 See id. 
207 See id. at *2. 
208 Id. at *3. 
209 Id. at *4 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
210 Id.   
211 Id. at *4, 6.  This is not the first challenge of the CDI-ASL interpreting process 
as a barrier to a defendant’s right to confront witnesses.  In People v. Vandiver, the court 
found the interpreter configuration adequate to protect the defendant’s right to con-
front the MLS witness because each interpreter served a unique function in the 
process.  468 N.E.2d 454, 457-58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). 
212 Vasquez, 2004 WL 348785, at *4. 
213 See id. 
214 See id. at *6 (noting the breadth of questions afforded to Vasquez). 
TUCK_FINAL_REVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2010  2:40 PM 
954 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 905 
fied errors and focused on an ancillary claim that Vasquez was unable 
to effectively confront Zapata because he was limited in the forms of 
questions he could ask: 
A lawyer cannot expect to use the same sort of questions when cross-
examining a child, a blind person, a witness who needs an interpreter, 
or, as here, a witness with substantial communication limitations.  Un-
doubtedly the attorneys were frustrated at having to ask one form of 
question when they would have preferred to ask another type; however, 
this restriction was not imposed upon them by the court. . . . The con-
frontation clause guarantees the opportunity to confront and cross-
examine, but this does not mean that a defendant has a constitutional 
right to ask a particular form of question.
215
 
Overall, though, this case illustrates problems that could be ad-
dressed if the testimony were videotaped outside of the presence of 
the jury, if the parties could subject the witness’s testimony to further 
examination, and if the court could squarely address these issues be-
fore possibly erroneous testimony goes to the jury. 
This proposal does have its costs.  First, it would make this aspect 
of the trial more time-consuming and expensive for parties to litigate.  
However, a court can offer this alternative model only when a party 
finds it valuable—that is, only when at least one of the parties finds 
the MLS witness’s prospective testimony crucial enough to its case to 
merit paying additional expenses at trial.  Earlier interactions, includ-
ing depositions, with the MLS witness may apprise the parties that 
they need to apply additional scrutiny to resolve ambiguities or mi-
sunderstandings in the MLS witness’s version of events.  That party 
would bear the burden of showing that it was substantially in its inter-
est or in the interest of the court to incur the additional costs.  If the 
MLS witness were peripheral, perhaps the added expense and incon-
venience would be too much for the small benefit of increased clarity; 
in those situations, the regular interpreter/CDI consecutive model 
may suffice.216  The court could also limit the boundaries of the chal-
lenges—if the parties do not already self-impose limits217—to misre-
presentation of facts only, leaving the interpreters’ handling of form 
or function unaltered. 
 
215 Id. (quoting People v. Tran, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 905, 912 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
216 But see LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 4, at 934-35 (discussing the need for ade-
quate and yet fiscally responsible due process accommodations). 
217 See supra text accompanying notes 171-172 (explaining the traditional reticence 
to object when the court may view the substance of the error as nonprejudicial). 
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Just as the court and the parties gain access to the nuances of in-
terlingual transfer when a translator prepares a written translation and 
presents it in both the source and target languages, so too could a 
court gain access to the richness and depth of the CDI’s interaction 
with the MLS witness.  This access would provide the court and the 
parties with greater insight into any latent but functional information 
contained within the interaction. 
This model has another ancillary benefit:  record preservation.  
The court’s videotape would document the major components of the 
interpretive process, and it would present a more complete picture to 
any appellate court reviewing the matter, where preservation of both 
the source and the target language renditions are essential to deter-
mining the adequacy of the interpretation.218 
CONCLUSION 
Courts are becoming polylingual environments.  In the American 
courtroom, spoken and written English are the swords and shields 
that adversarial parties and judges use to instruct, persuade, and 
coerce.  Only in the past several decades has the interpreter become a 
fixture in the courtroom as a medium of accommodation for non–
English speakers.  However, the legal profession too often accepts the 
conduit model, believing that the mere presence of a working inter-
preter is sufficient to ensure accurate transfer across languages.  In-
deed, many of the specific characteristics of language that perform 
key instructing, persuading, and coercing tasks do not always maintain 
their integrity as they move through the sieve of an interpreter. 
Inasmuch as a single interpreter may be a sieve, inadvertently fil-
tering or adjusting facts, form, or function of the language within the 
courtroom, an additional intermediary interpreter may compound 
these risks, especially because the CDI works with even greater latitude 
in her interactions with a semilingual or nonlingual witness.  These 
intermediary interpreters provide a valuable link to MLS witnesses.  
However, the court should reject the conduit metaphor, which leads 
to a belief that information transfer happens seamlessly in such an 
impaired and nuanced environment.  Further, the court should not 
 
218 See State v. Van Pham, 675 P.2d 848, 858 (Kan. 1984) (recording the trial 
court’s use of short-term audio-cassette recording to play back testimony when resolv-
ing interpreter disagreements); BERK-SELIGSON, supra note 42, at 200-02, 214, 217 (dis-
cussing the difficulties in handling appeals based on interpretation error when the 
record does not contain a recording); supra note 176 (noting the importance of origi-
nal language interpretation on appeal). 
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entirely rely on the adversarial environment to ensure interpreter ac-
curacy and competency when sufficient time is not granted to parties 
to meet the task. 
Instead, the court should consider deviating from its typical evi-
dentiary model when doing so might shed additional light on the 
nuances of the lingual and semilingual interaction of an MLS deaf adult 
testifying through CDI and ASL interpreters.  The steps used to intro-
duce document translations would help parties to more adequately 
monitor an MLS witness interpretation before it is provided to the jury. 
In the end, this will provide the MLS witness a fair opportunity to 
have her statement accurately recorded in the courtroom.  The parties 
will have a fair opportunity to review the interpretations to ensure the 
accuracy and integrity of the spoken interactions.  The jury or fact-
finder will receive an interpretation that more accurately aligns with 
the facts, form, and function the MLS witness intended.  Most impor-
tantly, the system of justice will move beyond the legal fiction that in-
terpreters transparently pass through language barriers. 
 
